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Abstract: 
This report describes the safety study performed as part of the EU 
supported project “Ammonia Cracking for Clean Electric Power 
Technology” 
The study addresses the following activities: safety of operation of 
the ammonia-powered vehicle under normal and accident (collision) 
conditions, safety of transport of ammonia to the refuelling stations 
and safety of the activities at the refuelling station (unloading and 
refuelling). Comparisons are made between the safety of using 
ammonia and the safety of other existing or alternative fuels. 
The conclusion is that the hazards in relation to ammonia need to be 
controlled by a combination of technical and regulatory measures. 
The most important requirements are: 
− Advanced safety systems in the vehicle 
− Additional technical measures and regulations are required to 
avoid releases in maintenance workshops and unauthorised 
maintenance on the fuel system. 
− Road transport of ammonia to refuelling stations in refrigerated 
form 
− Sufficient safety zones between refuelling stations and 
residential or otherwise public areas. 
When these measures are applied, the use of ammonia as a transport 
fuel wouldn’t cause more risks than currently used fuels (using 
current practice). 
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 Preface 
This study is performed as part of the project within the European Commision’s 5th 
framework programme: “Ammonia Cracking for Clean Electric Power Technology”. 
Work package 6 of this study considers the possible constraints in using ammonia as a 
transport fuel due to health and safety concerns. 
The main aim of this study is to perform comparative safety studies for the most 
important elements or life cycle phases in using ammonia as an ordinary fuel in cars, i.e. 
safety of the car itself, safety at the refuelling station, and safety of road transport of 
ammonia to the refuelling stations. These studies have been performed using 
conventional QRA (Quantified Risk Analysis) techniques and studies for similar systems 
(e.g. distribution of LPG for transport). Special attention has been paid to accidental 
conditions (“collision”) with respect to integrity of tanks and piping, and the 
consequences (fatalities, injuries) of loss of containment from tanks or piping.  
The system design is evaluated for safety improvement using hazard identification and 
hazard analysis methods (HAZOP and FMECA). Recommendations for improvement of 
safety are provided along with the risk assessment. 
Comparisons are made with the hazards of other fuels, either widely used (gasoline, 
Liquid Petroleum Gas – LPG) or possible alternatives for fuel-cell powered vehicles 
(hydrogen, methanol).  
Separate work package activities reported in this report and its annexes are:  
• Review and assessment of properties of ammonia, relevant for health, 
environment and safety in connection to application as a bridge fuel, and in 
comparison to alternative and conventional fuels (methanol, hydrogen, gasoline 
and CNG). The review includes acute and long-term toxicity, flammability, 
handling requirements, and environmental issues (Annex A).  
• Comparative consequence calculations (extent of adverse effects in case of a 
number of accident scenarios) for ammonia and the alternative or conventional 
fuels (Annex E) 
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 1 Methodology of safety assessment 
1.1 Scope of the study 
Ammonia is a widely used chemical in the process industry. It is produced and 
transported in large quantities. The use as a fuel for road traffic will increase the volume 
of the handled ammonia at production facilities and main, large scale storage facilities, 
but not change the existing structure or safety considerations. The part of the distribution 
chain that has to be developed as a new infrastructure is the distribution from medium 
scale depots to filling stations, and the handling at filling stations. Safety in relation to 
these activities, together with the presence of ammonia in general vehicles on the road, 
will be the main consideration for accepting ammonia as a fuel for road traffic. Safety 
aspects of the other parts of the chain (production, shipping and large scale storage) are 
based on existing, accepted technologies and depend fully on local conditions with 
respect to land-use planning and safety distances.   
 
Filling 
 stations 
 
Storage 
(medium 
scale) 
Figure 1 Flow of ammonia 
Production and 
Storage 
(centralized) 
Truck 
transport User transport
Figure 1 shows the flow of ammonia from production to the consumers. In this study the 
safety in relation to the truck transport, the refuelling station and the consumer vehicle 
will be treated.  The study for the safety of the truck is concentrated about accidents 
during transport, with release of ammonia, and the consequences for a third party. The 
study of the truck transport is based on probabilistic method, based on experience and for 
the consequence of the release dispersion models is used. The safety studies of the 
refuelling station and the vehicle system concern both possibilities of release of 
ammonia, which can influence people and the surrounding. Also failures of the 
equipment, which can cause damage to the system itself, is treated. The study of the 
refuelling station and the consumer vehicle is mainly based on HAZOP analysis. A 
FMEA analysis has been used to decide which safety equipments are necessary for the 
systems. 
1.1.1 Risk parameters 
With respect to assessing relevant risk parameters, different philosophies can be used, 
depending on what “target” of risk is in focus: a representative of the uninvolved public 
(“third party”), the society or groups within society, or users of the vehicles. The 
different risk parameters depend on various conditions: 
The local approach for a third party being present next to the road. Here the risk 
is proportional to the risk per accident and the number of hazardous vehicles 
(tank cars and private cars fuelled by the hazardous fuel) passing by or another 
“intensity” parameter (e.g. the quantity of handled fuel at a nearby refuelling 
• 
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 station). The relevant parameter is the individual risk (Note that individual risk 
is a geographical quantity, i.e. it present a spatial distribution of risk – the name 
suggests misleadingly that the risk is attached to individuals). This approach will 
be used for evaluation of the risk of transport of the fuels and the refuelling 
station. 
The social consideration (how many people can be killed by an accident 
country-wide). This risk depends (it is more complex than a proportional 
relationship) on risk per accident, population density along the route, total 
number of km/year for the hazardous vehicles. In order to calculate societal risk, 
the local conditions need to be known. In this comparative, general study, this 
parameter will not be used. 
• 
• 
• 
Risk for a hazardous-vehicle driver (driver’s risk) depends on the risk per 
accident and the number of km driven by the driver. The risk calculations for the 
ammonia-powered vehicles come very close to such a “vehicle-attached” 
individual, though this risk is expressed as a function of distance from the 
vehicle, so it provides information for the third party risk as well. 
Risk for a non-hazardous-vehicle driver (third-party driver’s risk) depends on 
the risk per accident, the intensity of the hazardous vehicle on the road 
(proportional to the total km/year of the hazardous vehicles) and the number of 
km driven by the driver him/herself. This risk is not explicitly accounted for, but 
the risk distances around the ammonia-driven vehicles are the required input to 
evaluate this risk. 
1.1.2 Comparison of safety aspects of ammonia with other transport fuels 
Ammonia should be compared to a number of alternative fuels with respect to safety and 
acceptability. The most relevant fuels for comparison are: 
− Gasoline 
− Liquid Petroleum Gas, LPG 
− Hydrogen 
Gasoline (petrol, motor spirit) is the most common fuel for (private) motor vehicles at 
present, widely accepted, though more flammable than e.g. diesel fuel. 
LPG, a mixture of propane and butane, is very similar in physical behaviour and 
technology with respect to storage, distribution and fuelling. Ammonia and LPG are 
distributed and stored at filling stations as a pressurised gas with a pressure of 6 – 10 bar. 
Pressurised hydrogen is the most probable alternative hydrogen carrier, but difficult to 
identify the technological solutions at this moment. Unknown variables are pressure, 
temperature (liquefied hydrogen being considered) or storage using hydrides.  
1.2 Use of Ammonia  
Ammonia is one of the most commonly used inorganic chemicals within the chemical 
industry. It is used for production of fertiliser, nitrates, explosives, nitric acid, amines, 
amides and textiles. Within the petrochemical industry it is used to neutralise acids in 
crude oil. 
In many areas Ammonia is used as protection gas e.g. by heat treatment of steel. The gas 
can be split up into its elements hydrogen and nitrogen, using a catalyst. The 
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thermodynamic properties of ammonia make it well suited as a medium in cooling 
systems, heat pumps and similar systems. Ammonia NH3 is a colourless, highly irritating 
gas with a sharp, suffocating odour. It dissolves easily in water and liquid ammonia 
evaporates quickly. It is commonly sold in liquid forms (dissolved in water or in 
pressurised tanks).  
Large amounts of ammonia are produced naturally in soil by bacteria, decaying plants 
and animals, and animal wastes. Ammonia is a key intermediate in the nitrogen cycle 
and is essential for many biological processes. 
For industrial purposes ammonia is synthesised from its elements nitrogen and hydrogen 
in large quantities. Exposure to anhydrous ammonia can cause blindness, lung damage, 
burns, or death. Symptoms include burning of the eyes, nose and throat after breathing 
even small amounts. See Appendix B. 
1.3 Regulatory aspects 
Storage, transport and handling of hazardous goods, including ammonia, LPG, gasoline 
and similar fuels, are subject to a variety of international, European, and national 
regulations. Additionally, regulations are in force that regulate the specifications, testing 
and maintenance of pressurised equipment (tanks and piping). For specific combinations 
of hazardous substances and applications, e.g. the use of LPG as a fuel in passenger cars, 
specific regulations and/or standards have been developed: The ECE UN Regulation 67 
covers requirements for LPG vessels in vehicles, construction, and approval but this 
regulations does not cover the control system. Similar regulations need to be developed 
for ammonia, or any other alternative, hazardous fuel, like natural gas or hydrogen. At 
present, the lack of appropriate regulation in the EU on the use of hydrogen in vehicles is 
considered a problem in the further development of hydrogen systems. The same 
situation would apply to ammonia systems in vehicles.  
It can be expected that ammonia applications would need to follow equivalent 
regulations as for NG and LPG, i.e. the regulations would include: 
− Specifications for equipment in relation to required safety level (perhaps 
performance based requirements);  
− Requirements that all components need a priori approval; 
− Requirements on workshops installing and maintaining the ammonia systems; 
− Requirements on authority control of the systems; 
− Requirements on periodic inspection. 
1.3.1 “Seveso-II”  
The European Council Directive “96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards 
involving dangerous substances” (European Council, 1997) (“Seveso-II directive”) 
regulates the production, handling and storing of hazardous substances. All relevant fuels 
for this study (ammonia, LPG, gasoline, methanol, hydrogen) are explicitly or implicitly 
(by means of the hazard classifications) subject to this directive. Industrial installations 
that have on their site a larger quantity of these substances than the threshold quantities 
are required to implement a major-accident prevention plan, which includes maintaining 
risk analysis and implementing specific safety management requirements. For ammonia, 
LPG and Natural Gas the threshold level (for the lower hazardous category – the 
directive distinguishes “low tier” and “high tier” installations) amounts to 50 tons. For 
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 hydrogen, the corresponding amount is 5 tons, for methanol 500 tons, and for gasoline 
2500 tons (amendment 2003/105/EC). As a consequence, it is recommended that 
refuelling stations’ storage capacity does not exceed the Seveso “low tier” threshold of 
50 tons ammonia. 
1.3.2 RID and ADR 
The RID (Regulations concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by 
Rail) and ADR (European Agreement concerning the International Carriage of 
Dangerous Goods by Road) regulate the conditions of the transport of dangerous goods 
by rail and road, respectively. The regulations are based on a set of substance 
classifications and they describe for different types of substances the principal 
requirements and conditions for packaging, including pressure vessels. The ADR 
regulates construction of packaging, tanks, vehicles, and requirements and conditions for 
loading and unloading, equipment and personnel at the vehicle, and documentation. 
1.3.3 Local regulations  
In all national countries exist regulations that cover storage and transportation of 
hazardous materials, covering ammonia. E.g. in Denmark, for transportable pressure 
vessels larger than 12 l, the Danish Occupational Health Agency and the Danish 
Emergency Management Agency have stipulated requirements for construction (steel), 
and requirements for storage. In general, permits are required for storage of pressurised 
gases.  
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2 Safety assessment of the ammonia-driven 
vehicle 
2.1 Description of the ammonia tank system design principles 
The tank system for the ammonia storage is very similar to the principles used for LPG. 
But in this case additional safety systems are included in the design, see Figure 2 
The tank itself is based on a concept developed by Advanced Lightweight Engineering, 
consisting of carbon fibres with a inner lining of polyethylene (PE). This construction is 
tested for LPG vehicles. The advantage over steel tanks is that it excludes (which has 
been proven for LPG) explosive failure if the tank in a fire. When heated by fire, the 
lining will melt and the contents will release through the porous fibres and burn in the 
fire. 
The tank system includes the tubing to a filling-hose connection point where the tank can 
be filled at a filling station. This part contains three systems to reduce the possibility of 
ammonia release: 
1 After filling the tank, the liquid ammonia in the tubing between the filling-hose 
connection and the tank will be extracted by vacuum-purging the tubing through the 
filling hose before disconnecting. This means that there is only a very small amount of 
ammonia in the tube outside the tank (safety system 1) 
2 To avoid overfilling of the tank, the tubing will be closed on a high level indication 
from the tank. In conventional LPG tanks, this system is based on a float-operated valve. 
Reliability analysis and –allocation (see below) of the final design will determine 
whether this system is adequate, or whether redundancy is required (safety system 2); 
3 A no-return check valve system is mounted on the tank to avoid flow from the tank 
into the tube to the filling-hose connection. This is included in conventional LPG tanks, 
but also here, reliability analysis and –allocation (see below) of the final design will 
determine whether redundancy is required (safety system 3) 
4 On the tank, a high-pressure relief system is mounted to cope with too high 
pressures as a consequence of overfilling and temperature rise. This venting system 
needs to release the ammonia in a controlled way, preferably to a point in the fuel 
delivery system before the reformer, as to convert the ammonia to harmless substances 
before emission (safety system 4). 
The last part of the system consists of the connection from the tank to the reformer. Part 
of this connection is the evaporator/pressure reducer. In this equipment, heat is provided 
(from the fuel cell cooling water) to evaporate the liquefied ammonia, and the pressure is 
reduced to the working pressure in the remainder of the fuel delivery system, which is 
approx. 1.5 bar overpressure. This part of the system includes two elements to ensure 
safe operation: 
1 The main valve on the tank controls the gas flow to the evaporator and reformer. In 
conventional LPG systems, this is a electromagnetic valve, that opens when it is 
activated (i.e. is closes when the electrical power fails). The activation is linked to a 
control system that determines when the valve needs to be closed, including situation 
when the down-flow tubing system fails. Detection can be in different ways, e.g. by high 
flow detection and gas sensors. The amount of gas that can leak through the down-flow 
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 tubing system is limited by reducing the tube diameter between the tank and the 
evaporator. For the power requirements for the target system, the maximum operation 
flow can pass without too high pressure loss is 8 g/s. This can be reached by a 2 mm ID  
(inner diameter) tubing. This relatively small diameter will reduce the consequences 
(release rates) of damages to the tubing before or after the evaporator (safety system 5) 
2 The evaporator is to be designed in such a way that it never closes completely. This 
avoids pressurisation of the tube section between the tank and the evaporator when the 
main valve is closed (safety system 6) 
The hardware parts of safety systems 2, 3, 4, and 5 are typically put together in a “multi-
valve” that is mounted on the inner core of the tank. 
 
 
Safety System 1
Safe connection to
Filling station and
depressurization
of filling line
Safety System 6
Depressurization of
 liquid line after operation
Safety System 5
Abort flow to evaporator
in case of damage or
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Pressure relief and
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Safety System 2
Avoid overfilling
Safety System 3
Avoid backflow from
tank to filling line
Tank
Heating
(Excess heat from
Fuel Cell)
Vaporizer
To reformer
Multivalve components
 
 
Figure 2. Principle of the ammonia tank system design. 
2.2 Failure and hazard analysis of the ammonia tank system 
2.2.1 Lifecycle phases 
The life cycle phases for the ammonia powered vehicle system include the following 
phases:  
− Commissioning (first time fill of the tank) 
− Start 
− Run (full load, low load) 
− Stop 
− Fuelling 
− Maintenance 
− Destruction 
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This study is based on a design stage of the full system and the analysis is therefore 
restricted to general considerations on some of the important phases, while others cannot 
be analysed without a more concrete knowledge of the system. This study addresses the 
following analyses: 
− A safety study of the car system during normal operation (start-up and running); 
− Requirements for refuelling; 
− A safety study of the refuelling stations 
− Some considerations regarding risk levels and requirements for maintenance work 
on the car tank system. 
2.2.2 Hazard identification: HazOp and FMECA 
To secure a safe system in the car, two studies for identifying potential hazards have 
been carried out using the primarily design of the system. The two methods used are a 
FMEA and a HAZOP study. The hazards in focus are releases of ammonia. The main 
purpose of the analysis is to design a sufficient safety system that prevents unnecessary 
releases during filling and driving. The FMEA analysis identified some need for safety 
systems, which are illustrated on Figure 2. This concerns primarily the tank system. 
The main results from the FMEA analysis are: 
− To secure that the connection system in the filling line are empty both before filling 
and after a filling a vacuum check has to be carried out to prevent a release of 
ammonia. 
− A pressure relief system has to be installed on the tank to prevent the tank from 
overpressure in case of overfilling. 
− An external frame to prevent the tank from damage in a collision is proposed 
− In case the external detector detects ammonia the current to magnetic valve should 
be cut-off. 
− Furthermore was identified need for ammonia detectors both inside the system and 
outside the system. Inside to prevent unreformed ammonia to get into the fuel cells 
and outside to detect external releases of ammonia 
The schemes from the analysis are in Appendix F. 
The HAZOP analysis was then carried out to supplement the FMEA analysis, as the 
FMEA analysis takes its starting point in a failure mode of a component and looks at the 
resulting consequences on the system, while the HAZOP analysis takes the starting point 
in a deviation of the process parameters, the consequences of this deviation and then the 
cause for this deviation is assessed.  
The main results from the HAZOP analysis are that the proposed safety systems will 
prevent the potential events found during the HAZOP study. The results are seen in the 
following scheme (Table 1). Schemes from the total analysis are in Appendix F. 
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 Table 1 Results of the HAZOP study of the car system 
System Event Safeguard Conclusion 
Fill line to 
tank 
Release due to check 
valve on tank fails 
and valve at 
connection fails as 
well on disconnection. 
Release by filling 
Disconnection safety 
system on car. Line empty 
 
 
Concentration based 
alarm, emergency shut 
down of fuelling station 
The safety system 
prevents a release 
of ammonia 
Tank Release  Safe design of the tank. 
The tank is designed to 
withstand a collision. 
External frame to protect 
tank on impact. 
In case of fire the lining 
will melt and cause only 
slow release. 
A level indicator protects 
overfilling and valves 
close at max. level. 
Gas alarm is installed 
Safety system on 
compressor and vacuum 
compressor to prevent 
damage on tank 
Max. flow valve in pipe 
from tank. 
The safeguard will 
prevent damage of 
the tank and a total 
release will only 
happen in very 
severe accidents. 
Small punctures 
with a leak will be 
detected by the gas 
alarm. This will 
also detect gas 
leakages from other 
parts of the 
ammonia system. 
The max flow 
valve in pipe fron 
tank and narrow 
pipes decrease a 
leak from this 
system. 
Evaporator Down-flow section on 
high pressure due to 
evaporator failure. 
Down flow system 
not designed for high 
pressure. Fuel cells 
will be destroyed and 
leaks can occur 
High-pressure alarm on 
down flow section closes 
main valve. 
Gas alarm installed 
The safety system 
will protect the 
down flow system 
and the fuel cells. 
 
Reformers Overheating 
 
 
Temperature control on 
burner 
Temperature control on 
El. reformer 
 
Burners 
and burner 
flue gas 
Release of burner fuel 
through the 
compressor 
Check valve on 
compressor 
This can happen in 
case the burner 
outlet is blocked. 
Absorbers Poisoned absorbers 
will allow NH3 into 
the fuel cells and 
damage these 
NH3 sensor   
Fuel cells  
 
 
 Leakages from the 
system are limited 
and will be 
detected by the gas 
alarm 
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2.3 Ammonia tank system safety functions and reliability 
allocation 
2.3.1 Requirements for tank structural integrity 
In order to reduce the possibility for damage during accidents, requirements have to be 
defined for the structural integrity of the ammonia fuel tank in the car. The probability of 
rupture of the tank during road accidents should be extremely low compared to the 
potential for other accident consequences (fatalities). Therefore, we suggest requiring 
that the tank structure (including any surrounding substructure to secure the tank) can 
absorb the energy of two frontally colliding cars of 2000 kg each at 100 km/h. In that 
case, each car has to absorb its own total kinetic energy 
)(½ 2 NmmVW =  
where 
m mass of vehicle (kg), 
V the velocity (m/s). 
The accident defined above corresponds to an energy of 0.4⋅106 Nm. According to the 
NASS GESS data1 (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2001), 1.8% of all 
accidents happens at velocities over 97 km/h, and 69% of these accidents causes severe 
damage to the car. Out of 1000 of these high-speed and severe-damage accidents, 8 
accidents concern frontal (head-on) collisions, and 0.4 of those involve medium or heavy 
vehicles.  
By linking the NASS GES fatality rate (1 out of 382 accidents has fatal consequences, 
data for 1999 to 2001) to the fatality rate per vehicle km (0.9 fatalities per 100 million 
vehicle km), one concludes that the general accident rate is about 350 per 100-million 
vehicle-km. If we assume that out of the high-speed, severe damage, frontal accidents 
with heavy vehicles, 10% of the events will lead to an ammonia tank rupture (because 
the absorbed energy exceeds the design values), we estimate that tank rupture may 
happen with a probability of 2⋅10-4 per 100-million vehicle-km (i.e. the likelihood of tank 
rupture is a factor 5000 lower than the likelihood of a fatal accident). The event tree is 
presented in Figure 3. 
Based on at least 50 billion vehicle km using LPG cars in the Netherlands since 19832 
without reported tank rupture, the probability of this event can be estimated to be less 
than 2⋅10-3 per 100 million vehicle km. Conventional LPG installations are subject to the 
American regulations FMVSS303 and the European ECE R34. These regulations 
involve head-on, side-on and rear-on impact tests at 48 and 35 km/h. Our more stringent 
requirement means that the probability of tank rupture of the ammonia tank will be lower 
than for the conventional LPG installations. 
                                                     
1 The NASS GES database is a collection of samples of detailed accident data from the US. For all 
records, a weight factor is included that describes how representative the sampled accident is in 
relation to the national accident statistics. Using this weight, the expected frequency of specific 
types of accidents (as described in the text) can be estimated 
2 This 50 billion vehicle km is based on the average yearly km/vehicle. Due to the tax structure, LPG 
cars are assumed to drive more than average km/year, this may possibly reduce the estimated 
probability. 
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Figure 3 Conditional probability of tank rupture in an ammonia driven passenger car 
when the tank structure is designed to withstand frontal collision at 100 km/h. 
2.3.2 Safety system reliability allocation 
For the operational phase of the passenger car, we distinguish the three likeliest 
possibilities for serious releases of ammonia. One reason is damage caused when the car 
is involved in an accident (physical impact and fire), one is overfilling of the tank, and 
the last one is a failure of the regulator causing overpressure in the fuel delivery system. 
The relations between events and conditions for accidents are included in a Bayesian 
network as shown in Figure 4. The likelihood of damage to a part of the ammonia system 
depends on the severity of the damage to the car as a whole, and the speed at the time of 
impact. Relations between these factors and accidents in general can be deducted from 
(National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 2001). Based on these factors, damage 
to the ammonia system components is assumed as to match experiences with gasoline 
and LPG vehicles. The components are the tank itself (assuming total failure), the tubing 
between the tank and the filling-hose connection, the tube between the tank and the 
evaporator/regulator (filled with liquefied ammonia) and the tubing between the 
evaporator/regulator and the reformer (filled with vaporised ammonia). Releases (or the 
condition of the releases) from these last three components depend on the functioning of 
some safety systems and the evaporator (if the evaporator/regulator fails, the down-flow 
tubing may be at full tank pressure). The reliability of the safety systems is chosen as to 
keep the likelihood of releases from the tubing only a factors 10 higher than the 
likelihood of total failure of the tank. This result follows the requirements for failure on 
demand following mechanical impact: 
− Safety system 3 (non-return flow system):  0.01. 
− Safety system 5 (main valve):   0.01. 
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Figure 4. Bayesian network to analyse the likelihood of serious ammonia releases with 
possible fatal consequences. The probabilities (in %) are conditional on an accident 
happening.  
The other relevant event is the consequence of overfilling. The assumption is that 
overfilling of the tank only is problematic if it is followed by a serious temperature rise 
(due to the outside temperature). Protection against overfilling is provided by the high-
level closing valve (safety system 2), while overpressure is mitigated by the pressure-
relief system (safety system 4), see Figure 5.  
Assuming filling operations every 625 km, one has to put the following reliability 
requirements in terms of maximum allowable probabilities of failure on demand on the 
safety systems: 
− Safety system 2 (high-level closing valve) 0.0001 (per filling operation) 
− Safety system 4 (high-pressure relief system) 0.0001. 
 
 
Figure 5. Bayesian network to analyse the likelihood of tank failure due to overfilling. 
Numbers are probabilities (in %) conditional on a filling operation. 
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 Failure of the pressure regulator is based on a Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of the 
pressure regulator of class 3-4. This SIL corresponds to a failure rate of 10-8 per hour. 
Assuming an average velocity of 60 km/hour, the failure rate becomes 0.017 per 100 
millions km. 
2.3.3 Safety during maintenance 
As seen on Figure 2 the components in the tank system are more complicated as in a 
conventional car using petrol. Especially there are a number of moving components such 
as magnetic valves, the fill-level and a connected safety system. In a conventional car the 
fuel tank is not a part involved in regular maintenance like the motor and filters. The fuel 
tank is replaced when leaking and this does not happen for all cars in their lifetime in 
perhaps 15 years. In the ammonia system the maintenance of the car system is 
maintenance of the moving parts and the safety system. An assumption is that 
maintenance is required on average every 100 thousand kilometres, which correspond in 
average to about every 7th year. This corresponds to 1000 maintenance actions per 100 
million km. An assumption is also that a release will happen (in a workshop) one time 
for every 1000 maintenance actions, which mean that there will be: 
1 release of ammonia per 100 million km. due to maintenance 
By comparing this with the likelihood of other failure possibilities, both for the vehicle, 
the tank transport and the refuelling station, it appears that this release  frequency is the 
most likely – an factor 10 higher than the likelihood of a small puncture in a vehicle tank 
during a collision, and a factor 10000 higher than the likelihood of release from a road 
tanker. This means that the hazards during maintenance need to be taken seriously into 
account by means of: 
− The demand for education of the maintenance staff in the workshops; 
− Additional technical safety equipment in workshops 
− The use of personal protection equipment (ppe) by maintenance staff 
− Avoiding unauthorised maintenance on the ammonia fuel system. 
2.3.4 Accident scenarios 
The final set of accident scenarios is listed in Annex D, together with the assessed 
probabilities based on the considerations and requirements described in the sections 
above. 
2.4 Comparison with LPG driven vehicles 
Conventional LPG systems have been the basis for the design principles for the ammonia 
storage systems. Both fuels are pressure-liquefied under similar conditions. Therefore 
also the possible incidents and accidents are quite similar: 
− Release of LPG following a vehicle accident. For conventional LPG systems with 
steel tanks, the failure of the tank in a fire is a realistic (and observed) scenario, see 
Figure 6; 
− Overfilling of the tank. In this case, the likelihood of overfilling due to the non-
redundant mechanical floater system is a factor 10 higher than in the ammonia 
system; 
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− Failure of the regulator – as all systems downstream of the regulator with a 
conventional combustion engine can be designed to resist an overpressure of ca. 7 
bar, this is not considered a realistic release scenario. 
 
 
Figure 6. Bayesian belief network to analyse the likelihood of serious LPG releases with 
possible fatal consequences. The probability is conditional on an accident happening. 
2.5 Comparison with gasoline-driven cars 
Gasoline is the most common fuel for passenger cars. Gasoline consist of a mixture of 
hydrocarbons (see annex A), between C4Hx and C12Hx. Hexane (C6H14) is commonly 
used to represent gasoline. Under normal conditions, gasoline is a liquid with a vapour 
pressure of 0.43 bar at 15oC. This means that saturated vapour (i.e. as it will be in a fuel 
tank) will have a concentration above the upper flammability level (UEL) of 7.4% by 
volume (i.e. there will NOT be an explosive vapour/air mixture in the tank). 
Release scenarios that would be able to have fatal consequences are considered to be the 
following: 
− Catastrophic failure of a pressurised fuel tank engulfed in fire, leading to a fireball 
(comparable to a BLEVE for LPG); 
− Formation of a large pool fire from an ruptured tank followed by ignition, causing 
heat radiation hazards; 
− Formation of a flammable vapour cloud from unignited evaporation from a pool in 
case of a ruptured tank, with possibility for delayed ignition of a flash fire or 
explosion. 
Fire hazards of gasoline are evident. Reports are made of 500 gasoline-fire related 
fatalities in the US. Little information is known about the frequency of the above-
mentioned scenarios. The NAS-GESS database includes information on cases where car 
accidents are followed by fire. It is hard to analyse how often the fires are caused by 
damage to the fuel system (tank and tubing) and how often fire causes the fuel tank to 
fail. Fuel tanks are often made of polymers or composite materials, which are likely to 
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 fail at relatively low temperatures, thereby avoiding the possibility of high pressure built-
up in the (intact) tank. But at 100oC, the vapour pressure of gasoline is 1.6 bar, and a 
rupture at this pressure would certainly generate a fast-burning fireball. 
To estimate the likelihood of failure, the following assumptions have been made, see 
Figure 7: 
− Rupture of the gasoline tank by mechanical impact is 5 times more likely than for a 
LPG-pressure tank, and likelihood increases with the square of the speed at impact; 
− Mechanical rupture leads to an evaporating pool if no fire is present, and to a pool 
fire if a fire is present 
− A fire leads to a fireball in 10% of the fire cases and only if the tank is not ruptured 
mechanically. 
 
 
Figure 7. Bayesian belief network to analyse the likelihood of serious gasoline releases 
with possible fatal consequences. The probability is conditional on an accident 
happening. 
2.6 Comparison with methanol-powered vehicles 
 
The scenarios for methanol are identical as those for gasoline. 
2.7 Comparison with hydrogen-powered vehicles 
The use and storage of hydrogen in cars and for other mobile applications is still in its 
infancy. There are a variety of options to carry a sufficient amount of hydrogen to drive  
a reasonable distance between refuelling without the use of excessive volume. Options 
include high-pressure storage at ambient temperature, cryogenic storage, storage in metal 
hydrides or hydrates. For the comparison, we assume the most conventional technique, 
high-pressure storage (600 bar) in a metal tank of about 100 l (1 m length, 36 cm 
diameter). Such a tank will carry about 5 kg of hydrogen, which has a comparable 
energy density as the 100 l ammonia tank or 40 l of methanol. 
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Figure 8 Possible configuration of a high-pressure hydrogen tank system 
Assuming the tank is made of high-quality steel, the wall thickness of the tank is 
expected to be ca. 25 mm (this will give a material stress of about 420 N/mm2 – other 
materials, such as composites, can be used as well). It is extremely unlikely that such a 
massive tank (with a weight over 250 kg) will be damaged in any car crash. The only 
failure mechanism for the tank as such is a fire engulfment. With a heat transfer of about 
100 kW/m2 it will take about 10-15 min to reach a temperature in the order of 1000 K, at 
which the material is likely to lose it strength. Overfilling can be easily avoided by 
controlling the fill pressure (maximum compressor pressure) at the filling stations, as 
there is no liquid that will expand with a temperature change. Therefore we recognize the 
following scenarios: 
− Tank failure with fireball due to fire engulfment when all safety systems (including a 
pressure relief valve) fail in closed mode; 
− Venting from the pressure relief valve in case of fire engulfment. A diameter of 0.8 
mm will provide a mass flow that is sufficient to vent the gas during the heating of 
the tank in 10 min. The released gas will burn; the flame will be at a few cm length 
and not pose any additional hazard. 
− Failure of the shut-off valve and failure of the regulator – as the systems downstream 
of the regulator (e.g. the fuel cell) will not be able to resist a pressure of 600 bar, 
such a failure would result in a high-pressure release, restricted by the diameter of 
the line from the tank to the regulator. This scenario will also occur when this line is 
punctured before the regulator, when the shut-off valve fails. 
− Rupture of the filling line together with failure of the check valve that normally 
prevents backflow through the filling line. As the filling line is larger (e.g. ID 6 mm 
as in the ammonia case), this would result in a larger high-pressure release than a 
failure of the line to the fuel cell. 
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Figure 9 Bayesian network and probabilities for serious hydrogen release scenarios 
conditional of a vehicle accident 
Figure 9 shows the Bayesian Belief Network and the estimated conditional probabilities 
for serious releases in case the vehicle is involved in an accident. For this estimation, it is 
assumed that the safety systems 3 and 5 as well as the regulator and the piping have 
similar reliability as for the ammonia system. This may be a conservative approach, as 
the higher pressure will mean stronger piping and fittings. 
2.8 Comparison between risk from the different fuels 
The consequences of the scenarios described in the previous sections have been assessed 
(see Annex D and Annex E). This assessment includes the conditional probabilities of 
flash fire, explosions, and injury by toxic substances, etc. The results can be compared as 
in Figure 10. From this picture it follows, that ammonia, when the systems are made as 
reliable as required in section 2.3.2, poses less risk than LPG and hydrogen driven 
vehicles. The large effect distances for hydrogen are caused by the large energy density 
of the released gas, even for very small holes. The difference between the risk levels for 
LPG and ammonia are due to the fact that the reliability requirements for the ammonia 
system are more severe than for the existing, conventional LPG systems, together with 
the fact that we assume that an carbon-fibre ammonia tank will not fail catastrophically 
in a fire. 
The fire and explosion risks for gasoline and methanol are at short distances comparable 
with those for LPG, but the effect distances for the worst events are smaller, especially 
for methanol. One should remind, that equally sized methanol and gasoline tanks are 
considered: the latter has a much higher energy content. The energy content of the 
ammonia, methanol and hydrogen tanks are comparable. 
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Figure 10 Comparison of individual risk as function of distance to a vehicle 
2.9 Conclusions and recommendations 
2.9.1 Risk acceptance 
Normal traffic safety in the US and Europe (Netherlands, Denmark) is little less than 1 
fatality per 100 million vehicle km3). Assuming an average speed of ca 60 km/h, this 
corresponds to 0.6 fatalities per million vehicle-hours. These fatalities include all 
victims, i.e. drivers, passengers, bicyclists and pedestrians. The fatality risk for drivers 
and passengers in passenger cars is slightly lower in the Netherlands (0.6 per 100 million 
veh. km in 1997). Based on an average of ca 31 000 km per passenger car per year 
(Danish data, 2001) one can estimate that any passenger/driver on average was exposed 
to a fatality risk of 2.3⋅10-4 per year. This risk can be considered to be the voluntary risk 
that drivers and passengers accept for using a car. 
This data does not allow estimating how much other groups of the population 
(pedestrians, people living next to the road) are exposed to road transport risk. 
The US GES data suggest that one out of 382 accidents is fatal, in order words, this data 
is based on about 350 accidents per 100-million vehicle-km. 
Some European countries accept that in the neighbourhood of major hazard installations 
(hazardous industry) risks from these installations expose the nearby population to an 
individual fatality risk (IR) lower than 10-6 per year before additional safety requirements 
need to be implemented. This level of IR is considered as a minor increase of the normal 
average lowest fatality risk during a humans’ lifetime (about 10-4 per year around the age 
of 14 to 20). 
For a new system to be acceptable, it should not contribute significantly to the total 
traffic risk level to neither the people participating in the traffic nor other groups of the 
population (actually, for a new system, one would require it to be safer than existing 
systems). 
                                                     
3 US data 2000: 0.9 fatalities per 100 million vehicle-km, Netherlands data 1997: 0.93 fatalities per 100 
million vehicle km, Denmark data 2001: 0.8 fatalities per 100 million person-km 
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 For the acceptance of ammonia, an a priori requirement will be that fatality due to 
ammonia release from the passenger vehicles needs to be a factor of 1000 lower than the 
“normal” fatality rate per km. Such a requirement does not guarantee acceptance by the 
public, as the risk perception of being victim in a car accident or the being exposed to an 
ammonia release depends on many other factors than probability alone. 
Probably a single event would rise considerable concern: with 100 % penetration of 
ammonia systems, the number above would correspond to ca. 1 ammonia related fatal 
event per year in countries like Netherlands or Denmark, which would be unacceptable. 
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3 Safety assessment of ammonia distribution to 
fuelling stations 
3.1 Risk assessment of conventional road transport of hazardous 
materials and transport fuels  
3.1.1 Studies on hazardous road transport  
A number of previous studies on risks related to transport by road of hazardous materials 
including gasoline, LPG and ammonia have been performed. TNO performed an 
extensive study related to LPG in the Netherlands in the early eighties (TNO, 1983). This 
study used an empirical approach towards accident statistics and release probabilities, 
and using consequence models to predict individual risk along transport routes. Brockhof  
(Brockhof, 1992) investigated the contributions of different failure mechanisms during 
accidents with road tankers and applied an empirical approach for individual and societal 
risk levels. Accident data in this study is mainly Danish. 
AVIV (AVIV, 1994) performed a study building further on the TNO LPG study, 
including data from other countries. The release distribution proposed by Brockhof’s 
study is included in the final risk model by AVIV. 
The Danish Transport Council performed a study on hazardous goods transport (Rømer 
and others, 2000). This study is with respect to road transport mainly based on the work 
by Brockhof. The study summarises a German study called “THESEUS”. Differences in 
estimated releases between the work by Brockhof and THESEUS are suggested to be 
due to differences between German and Danish traffic conditions, incompleteness of 
reported data (overrepresentation of serious accidents in databases) and the German 
focus on accidents between trucks. 
3.1.2 Accident statistics for heavy duty vehicles 
The risk models in the references mentioned in the previous section are all based on an 
analysis of hazardous goods release potential under the condition of an accident with a 
hazardous goods vehicle. In other words, the analyses derive conditional probabilities for 
a release once an accident has happened. For the total risk picture, the probability of such 
an accident needs to be included. However, how these accidents are defined is relevant. 
The accident probability is determined by accident statistics, and depends on how the 
accident data are collected – it can be expected that reporting of minor accidents is 
incomplete. AVIV has addressed this problem. The relevant accident data – which 
corresponds to the way Dutch accident data is collected – is based on “serious 
accidents”, i.e. accidents that lead to fatalities or hospitalisation of any of the involved 
parties. The study by Brockhof does not discuss this item. This means that results from 
different studies may need to be “corrected” for possible offset of the accident rates due 
to cut-off of small accidents before comparison. But for our purpose, where we want to 
compare different fuel transport options, this difference may be irrelevant as long as 
accident rates are similar for the different vehicles. 
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 Table 2 Truck accident rates according to three studies 
 Truck accident rate per 100 million vehicle km 
Road/traffic type TNO LPG 
study4 
AVIV study5 Brockhof’s 
study6 
All roads  44 22 39 
Motorways (100 to 120 
km/h limit) 
20 [1 - 200] 11  
Motorways (100 km/h limit)   4.3 
Rural (80 km/h limit) 50 [5 - 240] 47 30 
Urban (50 km/h limit) 70 [17 – 480] 29 420 
Table 3 Conditional probability of a "large" release (by AVIV and TNO defined as more 
than 100 kg) in case a road tanker with a thick-walled tank (pressure tank) is involved in 
an accident. 
 Conditional probability of a large release 
Road/traffic type TNO LPG 
study7 
AVIV study8 Brockhof’s 
study9 
All roads  0.05   
Motorways (100 to 120 
km/h limit) 
 0.039  
Motorways (100 km/h limit)   0.029 
Rural (80 km/h limit)  0.026 0.020 
Urban (50 km/h limit)  0.013 0.013 
                                                     
4 The TNO LPG study Dutch uses data for accidents (before 1982) with trucks without trailers and 
tractors with and without trailers. The data covers accidents where persons in a vehicle involved in 
the accident are injured, i.e. accidents without injury, or accidents with injured pedestrians or 
(motor) cyclists are excluded. 
5 The AVIV data is based on Dutch accident statistics 1990-1992 for heavy duty vehicles (trucks and 
tractors with and without trailers) and only includes accidents where persons in a vehicle involved 
in the accident are hospitalised or fatally injured. If the definition by the TNO LPG study is used, 
the average accident rate is 25 per 100 million vehicle km. 
6 The accident rates by Brockhof are based on a collection of Danish accident descriptions (based on 
police reports) and road characteristics from 1982-1986. Accident rates relate to accidents involving 
trucks (not defined in detail). There is no information about the severity of the accidents. The 
accident rates are transformed into regression formulae for different road types, and accounting for 
truck percentage and traffic intensity. The final accident rates are calculated using information 
about the total length of the road types in Denmark. 
7 Based on Dutch accident data before 1982 
8 The AVIV data is a correction on the conditional probabilities by Brockhof to reproduce the Dutch 
observation of a frequency of 0.1 large release (>100 kg) per year from 1978 to 1992. 
9 Conditional failure is derived from a deterministic model of the effect of collision energy, structural 
integrity of the tank, and statistical analysis of the type of impact in a large (Danish and US) 
collection of accident reports. 
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 In this study, a truck accident rate of 30 per 100 million km is used to represent the roads 
and conditions for fuel delivery to filling stations. Again, this being a comparative study, 
the absolute value of this truck accident rate is not critical to the final result. 
3.2 Scenario analysis of transport of ammonia in a road tanker 
from the medium storage to the filling station 
In this analysis the risk for a release of ammonia from a road tanker accident is assessed. 
The input for the analysis is: 
 
• 15% of the cars will use Ammonia as fuel. 
• Capacity of the road tanker is 44 m3, which correspond 23.9 t of Ammonia. 
• Fill rate of the filling station is 50 t every 14th day. 
• Distance from decentralized storage to filling station is determined to be 50 
km. 
• Car efficiency is 8kg/100km  
 
The risk for a release from road tankers can be calculated using a model for a single 
refueling station. 
 
 
 
50 km
Truck transport 
50 t /14 days 
Storage 
(medium 
scale) 
Filling 
 station 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ammonia used/year= 50*52/2= 1300 t/year. 
1.3 mill kg. requires 1300/23,9 transports of 50 km of the road tanker = 2720 km 
Data from a study in Denmark (Brockhof, 1992) gives for road tankers: 
30 incidents pr. 100 million road-tanker km. and 2%  will give a release. This results in  
6.00*10-3  accidents pr. 1 mill km with release from road tankers. 
For the single fuelling station scenario, a road tanker drives 2720 km. pr year/pr filling 
station, results in 1.65*10-5  accidents pr. year pr. filling station with release of ammonia 
from a road tanker. 
3.3 Risk assessment of additional transport of ammonia 
The study by Brockhof (Brockhof, 1992) includes a fault tree analysis for tank cars 
transporting flammable and toxic hazardous goods by pressure vessels (used for LPG 
and anhydrous ammonia) and thin walled semitrailers (used for gasoline and methanol). 
The analysis covers the consequences of a road accident (collision or roll-over), not the 
consequences of spontaneous malfunctions, ruptures or human errors. The information 
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 from this fault tree analysis, including the numerical data, has been used in this study and 
applied to ammonia, LPG, gasoline and methanol. Brockhof’s analysis includes four 
failure mechanisms: Puncture of the tank, rupture of the tank due to impact, failure due 
to abrasion (thin-walled tanks only) and rupture due to fire. These mechanisms have 
been transferred into four failure modes: small puncture (5 mm diameter hole) large 
puncture (75 mm diameter hole, corresponding to a 3” hole as used in the LPG study10 
(TNO, 1983), instantaneous release (complete rupture) and a fireball or BLEVE (not for 
ammonia), see Figure 11 for ammonia. Here the failure modes correspond to an 
instantaneous, large and small toxic vapour cloud, respectively. The distribution between 
instantaneous releases and large holes is according to (AVIV, 1994). 
 
 
 
  
Figure 11 Bayesian belief network for failure of an ammonia tank car (truck with 
pressure vessel) in case of a road accident. 
For LPG, the number of possible consequences is larger, depending on whether or not 
(delayed) ignition occurs, and whether the ignition causes a flash fire (without significant 
overpressure) or an (unconfined) vapour cloud explosion (VCE), see Figure 12. The data 
on probability of direct and delayed ignition is an estimation based on the information 
from (TNO, 1983) and (AVIV, 1994). The likelihood between VCE and flash fire is 
taken from (Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, 1999). 
 
                                                     
10 The AVIV study on hazardous transport by road considers a 3” hole as pessimistic and proposed to 
use a 2” hole size 
Risø-R-1504(EN)  27 
  
Figure 12 Bayesian belief network for failure of a LPG tank car (truck with pressure 
vessel) in case of a road accident 
In case of a thin-walled tank car, abrasion is a possible failure mechanism; this is 
included in Figure 13. In case of thin-walled vessels, the likelihood of puncture and tank 
rupture is larger, but the likelihood of ignition is (slightly) lower. 
 
 
 
Figure 13 Bayesian belief network for failure of a thin-walled semitrailer for 
transportation of gasoline of methanol in case of a road accident 
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3.4 Comparison of risk of transportation of different fuels 
In Annex E the consequence calculations are included corresponding to the Loss of 
Containment events as introduced in the previous section. The risk (expressed as 
Individual Risk depending on distance from a tanker) for ammonia tank trailers is shown 
in Figure 14. The Figure shows the risk connected to the conventional transportation by 
trailers with a single pressurised 45 m3 tank. Failure of such a tank leads to fatal 
consequences up to a distance of 800 m.  
 
Comparison of ammonia transport options
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Figure 14 Individual risk of different technological solutions for the transportation of 
ammonia by road tankers. 
3.4.1 Consideration of additional requirements and specifications for 
ammonia transport by road tankers 
One of the options for decreasing the potential of releases of ammonia is to divide a 
single pressure tank into smaller ones. The likelihood of several tanks failing in the same 
accident will be considerably smaller than the likelihood of failure of only one of the 
tanks, that absorbs the energy from the collision impact. However, the failure models as 
described in (Brockhof, 1992) are based on the assumption, that the contents of the tank 
absorbs the collision energy. As a consequence, smaller tanks require less energy to 
rupture, provided the construction is similar. This is demonstrated in Table 4. Note that 
for a conventional large tank, the collision with a passenger car (assumed mass 1000 kg) 
is not likely to damage the tank, while this may happen for the small pressure tanks.  
The resulting Individual Risk as function of distance to the road tanker is shown in 
Figure 14 (“partitioned, conventional construction”). One of the solutions is to improve 
the resistance to impact of the tanks by some energy absorbing construction to a level 
comparable to the resistance of the original large tank (Partitioned, improved strength”) 
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Table 4 Conditional probabilities of tank damage for single or multiple pressure tanks 
on a road tanker, in case of a collision. The numbers for a 12 m tank correspond to the 
numbers used by Brockhof (cf. Table 3), the numbers for a 3 m tank (i.e. 4 tanks on a 
tanker instead of a single tank) are derived considering the differences in energy needed 
to rupture a tank. 
  Likelihood of tank damage at a road with a speed limit of 80 
km/h 
  12 m long pressure tank 3 m long pressure tank 
Collision:  head-on end-on side-on head-on end-on side-on 
Tanker-truck 12% 8.9% 23.8% 19.7% 30.2% 44.7% 40.7% 
Tanker-van 8% 0.0% 0.9% 0.7% 6.1% 23.8% 17.6% 
Tanker-car 81% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 2.3% 2.4% 
All collisions:  1.1% 2.9% 2.4% 4.1% 9.0% 8.1% 
 
Still, the distances where fatal consequences can occur are considerable, as compared to 
the transport of LPG (see below). Therefore another option is to transport ammonia in 
cryogenic form, i.e. at a temperature around the boiling point of ammonia, but still in 
strong separated pressure tanks. As the flash fraction during catastrophic failure of one 
such tank is negligible for cryogenic ammonia, and evaporation of ammonia is a slow 
process, the amount of ammonia in the air is much lower, and the effect distances are 
accordingly shorter (see Figure 14, “Cryogenic, Partitioned, Improved Strength”). 
3.4.2 Individual Risk along the transport route and comparison 
Figure 14 shows Individual Risk as a function of distance to the road tanker, but a better 
way is to show the Individual Risk as function of distance to the road, see Figure 15. 
This Figure also shows the risk of transporting comparable amounts of gasoline or LPG; 
these amounts are made comparable with respect to the amount finally used by the cars 
(i.e. corrected for the “tank to wheel” efficiency of ammonia, LPG and gasoline). The 
road is a single route to a refueling station, using the scenario as described in section 3.2. 
(If a road is part of routes to several refueling stations, the risks have to be multiplied by 
the number of refueling station serviced by the road). From this Figure we can draw the 
following conclusions: 
1. Generally accepted risk criteria of Individual Risk of 10-6 per year are not 
exceeded along the route to a single refueling station by any of the fuel 
modalities using conventional technology 
2. Risk due to conventional transport technologies for ammonia extend to much 
larger distances than for conventional transport of LPG and gasoline 
3. The risk due to cryogenic transport of ammonia in advanced partitioned pressure 
containers is equal, if not lower, than for LPG, and comparable to transport of 
gasoline. 
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Figure 15 Risk due to transportation of fuel along the transportation route 
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 4 Safety assessment of ammonia refuelling 
stations 
4.1 Description of ammonia refuelling station principles 
The main principle of the ammonia filling station is that ammonia is stored at ambient 
temperature, but delivered cryogenic by truck. This requires a pressure tank as storage 
tank and a heating system in the filling line.  
 
Car Safety System 3
Avoid backflow from
tank to filling line
Car Safety System 2
Avoid overfilling
To Car Tank
 
 
Underground tank in filled
concrete pit
 
P
Vacuum pumpLogic controller
Optional heat exchanger for
cryogenic deliveries
 
Figure 16  Refuelling station 
It is assumed that 60-70 vehicles can be fuelled every day. The tank capacity of the 
vehicles is 53 kg. This mean that 50t of ammonia has to be delivered to the filling station 
every 14 days. The truck capacity is 23t of ammonia. 
The refuelling station consist of 3 main functions: 
 
1. Fill line from truck to tank. 
2. The tank 
3. Fill line from tank to vehicles (cars) 
The fill line consists of a connection part to the truck, a pump for the transport of 
ammonia. As the transport by truck is planned to be a pressure-less cryogenic transport 
at –34 oC, and the refuelling station tank is at ambient temperature  ~12 oC, a heating 
system is also required in the filling line. The principle of the heating system is not 
decided yet, but the system must have a capacity of 3MW to be able to heat 23t of 
cryogenic ammonia to ~12oC in half an hour. The required energy is equivalent to the 
burning value of 1.1% of the delivered ammonia. 
The tank is placed in a filled concrete pit to prevent the tank from collisions and fire. The 
tank has a capacity of at least 50 t of ammonia. Due to expansion of ammonia when 
heated, the maximum filling level is 80% of full tank volume. The tank is equipped with 
a level controller and a safety valve. In case of a leak from the tank or the connected 
pipes an ammonia detector is installed in the pit.  
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The fill line to the vehicles consists of 2 systems: one for filling the vehicles and one for 
emptying the line after the filling, to prevent release of ammonia when disconnecting the 
line. 
4.2 Failure and hazard analysis of the ammonia refuelling station 
A HAZOP analysis has been performed on the ammonia refueling station. The main 
problem addressed is release of NH3 
The HAZOP analysis was performed on the basis of the PI- diagram Figure 16 of the 
refueling station. The aim of the analysis was to optimize the design due to prevention of 
unwanted events and in case this is not possible how to mitigate the consequences of 
these events. The amount of ammonia in the systems in question: 
 
Truck    25 t  
Refuelling station  50 t 
Car    0.05 t    
 
The results from the HAZOP are the following: 
1. Fill line to tank 
In case of damage of the fill line system check valves must be installed to prevent larger 
amount of NH3 release.  
To prevent the truck to leave the filling system with the hose still connected an interlock 
system is proposed to be installed e.g. the car key is used in the filling system. 
As the transport by truck is planned to be a pressure-less cryogenic transport at –34 oC, 
and the refuelling station tank is at ambient temperature  ~12 oC, a heating system is 
required in the filling line. To heat 25 t of NH3 from –34 oC to 12 oC in half an hour 
require a heating system on 3 MW. The heating system is not designed yet, but the 
energy demand is ~1,1 % of the heated NH3, if NH3 is used as energy source. The 
amount of NH3 in the heating system is not known, while it depends on the system. A 
separate analysis must be performed on the heating system. A heating system on 3 MW 
is not a small system and must be expected to contain a certain amount of NH3 
2. Tank 
To prevent damage of the tank by collision or fire, the tank is proposed to be 
underground in a filled concrete pit. 
Damage of the tank can also happen by overfilling and heating. To prevent overfilling a 
level controller must be installed which close the filling line at a certain level in the tank. 
The worst-case scenario for overfilling is by a failure in the heating system with the 
consequence that NH3 at –34 oC is filled into the tank. Assumed that the maximum 
filling level is 80% and the amount of NH3 at this level is 50t at 12 oC. The volume of 
50t of NH3 is 80.5 m3.  This means that the total tank volume is ~100 m3. If the tank is 
filled 80% with NH3 at –34 oC the amount of NH3 at 80% level is 55t. The 55 t of NH3 
will be heated to ambient temperature 12 oC and the volume will increase to 88.5 m3, 
which is ~88% of a full tank. To exceed the volume of the full tank it requires a 
temperature on 62 oC. and this is not seen as a possible event. 
Overfilling can also happen in case the level controller fails and the tank will be 
pressurized to the max pressure of the filling pump. The design of the tank must ensure 
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 that the maximum allowable pressure in the tank is above the maximum pressure of the 
pump. A safety valve is installed on top of the tank.  
3. Fill line to car 
In case of damage of this fill line, check valves must be installed to prevent larger 
amount of NH3 release. As for the truck connection an interlock must be installed to 
prevent the car to leave the refuelling station with the hose still connected. 
4. Vacuum system 
A vacuum system is installed to empty the hoses and prevent a release of NH3 when 
disconnecting the hose from the car. A pressure control system is installed to ensure that 
disconnection can only be performed at a certain low pressure. 
Table 5 Main conclusions from the HAZOP tables (APPENDIX F) 
System Event Safeguards Conclusion 
Fill line to 
tank 
Fill line to 
car 
Release Check valves 
installed 
If a damage to the fill line occur 
only a minor release of NH3 will 
happen due to the installed check 
valves 
 Heating 
system. 
NOT 
TREATED 
Release Check valves 
between the tank 
and the heating 
system 
The heating system is not designed 
yet but require an effect of ~3MW, 
if the filling operation is estimated 
to take 0.5 hour. The possible 
amount of NH3 to release e.g. due 
to a collision is the content of the 
heating system. 
Tank Release due 
to collision 
and 
corrosion 
Tank in filled 
concrete pit. NH3 
detector. Check 
valves, safety 
valves. Corrosion 
protection. 
To avoid collision and the 
consequences of a rupture of the 
tank and the connected pipes, the 
tank is placed underground in a 
filled concrete pit  
The tank must be inspected or 
tested regularly (Pressure tank) 
 Release due 
to rupture 
after an 
overfilling 
and heating 
of the tank 
The tank must be 
filled to no more 
than 80% of full 
volume. 
Level control. 
The restriction on the maximum 
filling level gives place for 
expansion of 50 t of NH3 at  –33 
degr. C up to ~62 deg. C 
Heated up to 12 deg. C the NH3 
will expand to 88% of a full tank 
 Release due 
to fire 
Tank in filled 
concrete pit. 
When the tank is placed 
underground the exposure to fire is 
minimal. 
Vacuum 
line 
No vacuum Pressure control Minor release of NH3 
Filling lines 
(in both 
ends) 
Forgotten to 
disconnect 
the cars 
before 
driving          
=> release 
Interlock system 
between car and 
filling system 
If an interlock is established, so that 
the car is not able to drive, it is 
assumed to be a safe solution. 
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4.3 Findings from consequence assessment 
The delivery of ammonia or LPG takes place at existing refuelling stations where the 
main delivery exists of gasoline. It is assumed that the physical lay-out of the refuelling 
station is such, that the delivery of gasoline, an any fire hazards resulting from that, does 
not interfere with the delivery of ammonia (or LPG) by tank car to the refuelling station. 
Annex D contains an analysis of the expected frequencies of a variety of possible release 
scenarios. For ammonia, these scenarios are: 
• Rupture of the road tanker tank 
• Rupture of the (underground) storage tank 
• Release through a large, 50 mm hole (rupture of the unloading arm or hose 
between the road tanker and the refuelling station) 
• Release through a 13 mm diameter hole (rupture of the delivery hose from the 
refuelling station to the car) 
• Release through a 5 mm puncture (leak of pipe or hose) 
The consequences of these scenarios (see annex E) are very similar to the scenarios for 
the road tanker transport – differences are due to the different hole sizes, in combination 
with the fact that the duration of the larger releases can be longer (assuming one fails to 
interrupt the flow through the rupture from the storage tank at the refuelling station). 
Fatal distances can reach up to 470 m in case of instantaneous failure of a pressure tank 
(conventional transport) which can be reduced to little more than 200 m by applying 
(semi) refrigerated transport in separated tanks – in that case, release from the heating 
system through a rupture in the 50 mm piping or hose is more serious, with a fatality 
distance of 475 m. 
4.4 Fuelling station safety functions and reliability allocation 
For all ruptures and leaks in hoses and pipelines (including the hoses for delivery to the 
car), the expected failure frequencies as presented in Annex D assume that a blocking 
system with a Probability of Failure of Demand of 0.01 (essentially a SIL 2 system) 
blocks off the failed hose or the section of the failed pipe before a major release occurs. 
It appears that the release of ammonia from relatively small leaks (e.g. 5 mm leaks in the 
delivery hose) can cause considerable fatality distances (up to 150 m) if not immediate 
action is taken (fatality increases when the exposure duration increases).  
It is therefore recommended that rupture of the 50 mm hose (the road tanker unloading 
facility) as well as the 13 mm hose (the delivery hose for the passenger cars) are 
protected by another, independent system of SIL 2 (PFD 0.01). This system could react 
on unbalance in flow and/or pressure drop in the system. Risks for this option will be 
denoted “extra safeguards”. 
In case refrigerated ammonia is unloaded from the road tanker, the refuelling station 
needs an evaporation unit. Introducing a new piece of equipment increases the possibility 
of failure. We assume that the design is such, that releases can not be larger than for the 
hoses (i.e. the pipe diameters are not larger than the assumed 50 mm for the unloading 
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 hose. The hoses are still the most likely points of failure (as compared to fixed piping), 
and the increased likelihood of failure from the evaporator is neglected in this study. 
4.5 Comparison with fuelling stations for other fuels (LPG and 
gasoline) 
The combination of consequences and expected failure frequencies (Annex E and Annex 
D, respectively) are presented in the form of a risk-distance graph (see Figure 17. The 
comparison is based on the handling of fuel with equivalent energy contents (“tank –to-
wheel” comparison). As described above, the small ammonia releases have 
comparatively large fatality distances. Using “conventional” delivery and handling of 
ammonia (this includes blocking systems for ruptures and leakages, but these are 
common for all fuels in this comparison), a safety distance to and individual risk level of 
10-6 per year would be more than 150 m. By using extra safeguards, this distance can be 
reduced to some 70 to 120 m, but this still considerably larger than for gasoline and LPG 
(some 30 to 40 m, respectively). As shown in Figure 17, there is relatively little 
difference between LPG and ammonia in the largest effect distances, especially the 
effects of catastrophic releases due to complete storage tank failure. 
By using refrigerated ammonia to be delivered by the road tankers, the consequences of 
the larger events are diminished to distances less than for LPG, but this is at negligible 
risk levels. 
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Figure 17 Individual risk as distance from a refuelling station for fuelling of equal 
energy amounts of ammonia, LPG and gasoline. The options "ammonia (extra 
safeguards)" and  "ammonia (refrigerated)" include both the extra safeguards to 
mitigate hose ruptures. 
4.6 Conclusions and recommendations 
Ammonia refuelling stations will require a safety distance to residential areas, or areas 
otherwise frequented by the general public, which are considerably larger than those 
needed for LPG or normal gasoline stations, from 120 up to 400 m depending on the 
Risø-R-1504(EN)  37 
number of redundant safeguards installed, if an individual risk criterion of 10-6 per year 
is applied. For LPG, comparable distances would be 40 to 80 m. 
The storage tank need to be located underground as to avoid any possible impact 
(physical or from fires). The likelihood of catastrophic failure of such a tank is reduced 
considerably as compared to above ground tanks, according to current practice for LPG 
tanks. For environmental reasons (avoiding leakages to the soil), the tank needs to be 
isolated from the ground, e.g. by using a (sand-filled) concrete pit. 
The unloading, storage, and delivery systems need to be protected with additional, 
independent reliable safeguards that shut off the flow to any damaged section as 
compared to the conventional protection systems for LPG refuelling stations. 
The use of refrigerated ammonia by the road tankers has relatively little effect on 
reducing the risk level around the refuelling station. It reduces the consequences of the 
worst possible accident (instantaneous failure of the road tanker at the refuelling station), 
but this has no significant contribution the risk level around the refuelling station. 
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 5  Conclusions 
This study addressed the safety aspects of the use of ammonia as a fuel in ordinary road 
vehicles. Three aspects have been considered explicitly: 
• Risks of ammonia in the (passenger) cars; 
• Risks of increased transport of ammonia by road tankers to the refuelling 
stations; and 
• Risks of handling (unloading, storing and delivering) ammonia at refuelling 
stations. 
There are also risks in the production and at storage facilities, but these risks are very 
local, partly confined to existing hazardous (production) facilities, and in any case very 
local, and therefore these aspects need to be considered (and can be solved) as a part of 
local land-use planning. These aspects are not considered to be prohibitive for the 
extended use of ammonia as a transport fuel. 
With respect to the risks at the level of individual vehicles, it is necessary to implement 
advanced fuel tanks and safety systems, which are beyond the current practice (as 
compared to LPG (Liquid Petroleum Gas)-driven vehicles). When these safety systems 
are implemented, the risks of using ammonia is similar, if not lower than for the other 
fuels (the maximum fatality distances is marginally larger than for LPG, but the risks for 
lesser releases is lower). It should be noted that a first assessment of a system based on 
pressurised hydrogen shows a risk slightly larger than for LPG. 
Special attention is required to ensure safe maintenance on ammonia-powered vehicles. 
A first estimate suggests, that the likelihood of releases of ammonia during the life cycle 
of the vehicle (calculated per km) is largest during maintenance: this probability is 
estimated to be ten times higher than any other releases for the vehicle. 
With respect to transport of ammonia by conventional road tankers, large releases 
show large consequence distances (more than 600 m) as compared to the transport of 
LPG and gasoline. Though, conventional transport in the quantities assumed in this study 
(a penetration of 15%), will not cause risk levels along the transport routes to exceed 
individual risk levels of 10-6 per year. Nevertheless, risk-reducing options are strongly 
needed.  
A solution that causes the risk levels to drop below the risks for LPG requires that 
ammonia be transported in refrigerated form (i.e. the temperature of the ammonia is very 
close to its boiling point), in road tankers carrying typically four separated (pressure) 
tanks of about 11 m3 each, which are as resilient against impact and abrasion as 
conventional (large) pressure tanks. The heat required to evaporate the ammonia at the 
refuelling stations corresponds to about 1% of the energy content. 
With respect to handling of ammonia at refuelling stations, it appears, that small, but 
long-lasting releases of ammonia due to e.g. leaks and ruptures of hoses, cause serious 
dangers at distances up to 150 m distance, which are considerably longer than the 
comparable distances for gasoline or LPG (where similar distances are about 40 m). This 
requires additional technical safeguards to reduce the likelihood of these releases (It is 
especially important to stop the release as soon as possible to interrupt exposure). But 
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also in case these safeguards are in place, safety distances around these ammonia-
refuelling stations should be no less than 70 m 
An overall conclusion is that the hazards in relation to ammonia need to be (and 
probably can be) controlled by a combination of technical and regulatory options. The 
most important additional requirements are: 
• Advanced safety systems in the vehicle 
• Additional technical measures and regulations are required to avoid releases in 
maintenance workshop and unauthorised maintenance on the fuel system. 
• Road transport in refrigerated form 
• Sufficient safety zones between refuelling stations and residential or otherwise 
public areas. 
When these measures are applied, the use of ammonia as a transport fuel would be no 
more dangerous than currently used fuels (using current practice). 
It should be emphasised, that this study does not exclude any accidents where the release 
of ammonia from a car will kill a driver, passenger or other individuals, but is expected 
that this will happen no more often, than that people are killed by burning gasoline or 
LPG. The acceptance of ammonia will not be based on the results of numerical risk 
analysis, but will also be influenced by the public’s perception of the threats of ammonia, 
and people tend to be more horrified by toxic substances than by fires. This public 
perception cannot and should not be ignored or dismissed. 
5.1 Uncertainty 
It has been attempted to use best available data for the estimates of failure frequencies 
and consequence assessment. But due to the need to use assumptions in case of lack of 
data and experience, the absolute level of the risk estimates (e.g. safety distances) 
contains a significant uncertainty. With respect to the comparative studies, the relative 
ranking is considered to be much more reliable, as assumptions are used consistently for 
the analysis of the different fuel systems. But mainly due to the different nature of the 
substances and their impact, some uncertainty remains here as well. The uncertainty in 
the comparative studies between LPG and gasoline on one hand and ammonia on the 
other relates to modelling impact and likelihood of fire and explosion compared to toxic 
impact, and the modelling of dense and buoyant vapour dispersion from evaporating 
pools for LPG/gasoline and ammonia, respectively. 
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Annex A – Comparison of Ammonia with 
other transport fuels 
42  Risø-R-1504(EN) 
1 General information 
1.1 The NFPA  no. 704 index – a system of hazard 
identification 
In the following the NFPA index (Anon, 1976) is described and indices are 
given for the relevant substances for this study. The index is intended for emer-
gency personal in particular fire fighters to be prepared to handle fires and 
emergencies at fixed installations, e.g. at chemical processing equipment, stor-
age and warehousing rooms and laboratories. The index informs a fire fighter 
about the precautions to take to protect himself from injury while fighting a fire 
in the area. Each hazard is rated from 0 to 4 (Anon, 1976), page 3-131). The 
rating system gives a rough overview on possible hazards, but is not meant to be 
very adequate. In general meanings the rating inform a fire-fighter on how to 
approach in different situations according to the highest rating found. This is: 
4  “too dangerous to approach with standard fire-fighting equipment and 
procedures. Withdraw and obtain expert advice on how to handle”; 
3  “Fire can be fought using methods intended for extremely hazardous 
situations, such as unmanned monitors or personal protective equipment 
which prevents all bodily contact”; 
2  “Can be fought with standard procedures, but hazards are present which 
require certain equipment or procedures to handle safely”; 
1  “Nuisance hazards present which require some care, but standard fire-
fighting procedures can be used”; 
 0  “ No special hazards which require special measures”  
 
Ratings are given for three types of hazards and occasionally supplemented by 
some special symbols e.g. when the use of fire fighting water may be danger-
ous. The three categories are: 
 
Health  
(Anon, 1976)- single exposure is evaluated varying from few seconds up to an 
hour. In emergency situations the rescue personal (fire fighters) are exposed to 
demanding physical exertion. This may be expected to intensify the health ef-
fects, but special local conditions need to be considered as well. The rating is 
considering this and based on normal protective equipment used by the fire 
fighters.  
4: Materials too dangerous to health to expose fire fighters. A few whiffs of 
vapour could cause death, or the vapour or liquid could be fatal on pene-
trating the fire fighter’s normal protective clothing. Protective clothing 
and breathing apparatus available to average fire department will not pro-
vide adequate protection against inhalation or skin contact with these ma-
terials. 
3:  Materials extremely hazardous to health but areas may be entered with 
extreme care. Full protective clothing, self-contained breathing apparatus, 
rubber gloves, boots, and bands around legs, arms and waist should be 
provided. No skin surface should be exposed. 
2:  Materials hazardous to health but areas may be entered freely with self-
contained breathing apparatus. 
1:  Materials only slightly hazardous to health. 
0:  Materials which on exposure under fire conditions would offer no health 
hazards beyond of ordinary combustible material. 
 
Flammability  
(Anon, 1976) – The basis for the ranking for this hazard is the susceptibility to 
burning of the materials which has an influence on the method on how to attack-
ing the fire: 
4: Very flammable gases or very volatile flammable liquids. If possible, 
shut off flow and keep cooling water streams on exposed tanks of con-
tainers. Withdrawal may be necessary. 
3:  Materials which can be ignited under almost all normal temperature con-
ditions. Water may be ineffective because of the low flash point of the 
materials. 
2:  Materials which must be moderately heated before ignition will occur. 
Water spray may be used to extinguish the fire because the material can 
be cooled below its flash point. 
1:  Materials that must be preheated before ignition can occur. Water may 
cause frothing if it gets below the surface of the liquid and turns to steam. 
However, water fog gently applied to the surface will cause frothing 
which will extinguish the fire. 
0:  Materials that will not burn. 
 
Reactivity (Stability) hazards  
(Anon, 1976)  - The ranking within the reactivity hazards is based on the sus-
ceptibility of materials to release energy either by themselves or in combination 
with other materials. Hereunder it is considered fire exposure along with condi-
tions of shock and pressure. 
4:  Material that is so susceptible to detonation that it is too dangerous for 
fire fighters to approach the fire. Vacate the area. 
3:  Materials, which when heated and under confinement are capable of 
detonation. These materials are too dangerous to fight with hand lines, 
but may be kept from detonating if unmanned portable monitors or hose 
holders can be set up from behind explosion-resistant locations. 
2:  Materials, which will undergo a violent chemical change at elevated tem-
peratures and pressures. Use portable monitors, hose holders or straight 
hose streams from a distance to cool the tanks and the material in them. 
Use caution. 
1:  Materials, which are normally stable but may become unstable in combi-
nation with other materials or at elevated temperatures and pressures. 
Normal precautions in approaching any fire should suffice. 
0:  Materials, which are normally stable and, therefore, do not produce any 
reactivity hazard to firemen. 
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Table 1 Ratings according the NFPA no. 704 (state 1976). The ratings span 
from 0 to 4 (0 = no special hazards; 4 = severe hazards).  
Substance Health Flammability Reactivity 
Ammonia 3 1 0 
Natural gas 1 4 0 
Methane 1 4 0 
Hydrogen 0 4 0 
LPG (propane & butane) 1 4 0 
Methanol 1 3 0 
Gasoline (92 octan) 1 3 0 
 
From above it is seen that ammonia is the most hazardous due to health effects, 
but the least hazardous due to flammability. All considered substance 
/compounds are ranked as not reactive in emergency situations.  
 
The NFPA categories for health are found to correspond very well with the cri-
teria in the following table. The only differences are that the upper threshold 
limit for extremely toxic is < 5mg and that there is one less categories in the 
NFPA consideration. Therefore, the table below is a more detailed scheme to 
evaluate health hazards, which is in accordance with the above mentioned. 
  
 Toxicity Classes (Varela) 
Corresponding 
NFPA index1 
Toxicity 
rating 
Descriptive 
term 
LD50(wt/kg) 
Single oral 
dose rats 
LC50(ppm) 4 
hours inhala-
tion Rats 
4 1 Extremely 
toxic 
< 1mg < 10 
3 2 Highly toxic 1 – 50 mg 10 – 100 
2 3 Moderately 
toxic 
50 – 500 mg 100 –1000 
1 4 Slightly toxic 500 – 5000 
mg 
1000 – 10000 
0 5 Practically 
non-toxic 
5000 – 
15000 mg 
10000 – 100000
 6 Relatively 
harmless 
> 15000 mg > 100000 
 
The overall assessment for the different hydrogen sources and gasoline reveal 
that all materials have a rating of 3 or 4 and thus may cause large difficulties in 
emergency situations. Nevertheless, for ammonia it is due to the health while 
the others are very flammable. The rating of 3 for ammonia indicates that emer-
gency situations may be handled by professionals having the right protection 
available. Most of the others have a rating of 4 for flammability that may be too 
dangerous to handle. 
 
Another approach to rank the potential fire hazards of compounds is the RF in-
dex, recently invented by Kondo et.al.(Kondo et al., 2002). The RF index is 
based on the upper and lower flammability levels as an indicator for the ignition 
probability and the heat of combustion of the flammable compound: 
                                                     
1 The NFPA rating for ammonia is 3 taking into account the physical stress of emergency people, 
taking the toxicity classes from the hanbook the toxicity levels for ammonia correspond to the 
classes  3 for oral and 4 for inhalation corresponding to NFPA ratings of 2 and 1, respectively. 
Thus the NFPA rating “overpredicts” the toxicity. 
0.5
U = upperflammability limit (vol %)
L = lowerflammability limit (vol. %)
kJQ = heat of ombustion
mol
gM = molecular mass of fuel
mol
1
c
QURF number
L M
       
   
   
− = −
 
 
Substance RF number [kJ/g] 
Ammonia 7 
Methane 40 
Hydrogen 402 
Propane 52 
Butane 59 
Methanol 29 –41 (different Flam. 
Limits found) 
Ethanol 39 
 
It is seen that the RF index is rather sensitive to the parameters. According to it 
ammonia is by far the less hazardous compound due to ignition probability and 
hazard. Hydrogen is by far the most hazardous substance. 
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3 Ammonia 
3.1 Summary of hazardous behaviour 
Ammonia is to be classified as poisonous to humans by inhalation (4, slightly toxic; NFPA class 1) and oral 
(3, moderately toxic, NFPA class 2) and very toxic to aquatic organisms (category 2 (with tendency to cat.1) 
assuming oral dose category as equivalent to uptake in fish).  Exposed to higher concentrations of ammonia 
skin, eyes and lungs may be damaged. Ammonia effluent may be very cold giving frostbites. The ammonia 
air mixtures are not readily ignitable, but if ignited explosion may occur. Ammonia is considered not to sus-
tain combustion, but flashing occurs. In case of a fire involving ammonia emissions of NOx and ammonia 
vapour with hydrogen and water have to be expected. At higher temperatures ammonia may react with car-
bon monoxide or methane to generate hydrogen cyanide. Ammonia is not compatible with a number of 
chemical compounds.  
The NFPA rating for ammonia is for health 3; for flammability 1 and for reactivity 0 
3.2 Classification 
Synonyms: Anhydrous ammonia 
CAS 7664-41-7 
EINECS 231-635-3 
RTECS  BO0875000  
NFPA ratings (0-4): Health 3, Flammability 1, Reactivity 0  
Dot no. UN 1005 Non-flammable gas; UN 2073 ; UN guide 125 
3.3 Summary of important properties  
Chemical formula: NH3  
Formula mass: 17.03 g/mole 
Melting pt. (°C)  -77.73  
Solubility in water 54 g/100 mL; Sol. (89.9 g/100 mL at 0 C) 
Boiling pt. (°C) -33.34  
Flash point (°C): 11 
Autoignition temp. (°C) 651/ 630 
Explosive limits (%)  (lower – upper) 15  - 28 
Specific gravity (at b.p.): 0.6818 (kg/l) 
Vapor density  0.59 kg/l;  
V.P. (mm Hg)  2728 / 8000 hPa 
 
Ammonia is a colourless gas with a penetrating, pungent suffocating odour detectable at 17 ppm. Interna-
tionally, it is shipped with a label “Poison gas” , domestically with a label “Non flammable gas” in tank cars, 
tank trucks, and cylinders. Anhydrous ammonia is stored as gas or compressed liquid and also as cryogenic 
liquid. Ammonia is highly water-soluble and it is a light molecule and diffuses rapidly in air. Releases from 
pressurised tanks will cause a dense gas cloud due to the low temperature. 
3.4 Environmental hazards 
Ammonia has some environmental effects and is very toxic when released into aqueous environments. Other 
effects /limitations are: 
Air: contribution to acid rains & NOx emissions; green house potential 
Water: Very toxic to aquatic organisms (R50); LC50 trout: 0.16 – 1.1 mg/l /96 hours; CSB (Chemischer Sau-
erstof Bedarf): 2200 g/l (undiluted ammonia) (see Agrolinz MSDS ) 
Soil: inhibits activity of micro-organisms in earth. 
Ground water: Threshold value for drinking water is applied. 
3.5 Human hazards 
Acute: 
Toxic by inhalation. Higher concentrations (in %) causes burns to eyes, skin and mucus membranes 
Rapid evaporation of the liquid can cause frostbite 
LCLO inhalation man 5000 ppm in 5 min 
LC50 inhalation rats: 2000 ppm in 4 hours 
LD50 oral 350 mg/kg 
 
Long term 
MAK-Wert 50 ml/m3 (ppm); 35mg/m3; spitzenbegr. Kat. I 
Hazard symbols: T poisonous; N environmental hazards; flammable; poisonous by inhalation; very poison-
ous for organisms in water 
3.6 Fire hazards 
Ignition: Hard to ignite  
Fire emissions: nitrous gases , ammonia, hydrogen and water 
Extinguishing: carbon dioxide; do not use water 
3.7 Compatibility with other compounds 
Ammonia reacts corrosive with many non-ferrous metal and alloys, such as copper, brass. Ammonia reacts 
violently with acids 
 
Hazardous reactions are known with the following compounds: 
Exothermic reactions: 
Acetaldehyd, acrolein, Barium, halogenic borium, bromine, brom penta fluoride, hydrogen bromide, cal-
cium, chlorodinitrobenzene, chloro-silane, chloro trifluoride, chloro compounds hydrogen chloride, chro-
mium trioxide, chromylchloride, dimethyl-sulphate, di-nitrogenoxide, ethyleneoxide (polymerisation), fluo-
rine, hydrogen fluoride, halogens, hypochloric acid, potassium chlorate, carbon dioxide, methyl mercaptane, 
nitryl chloride, oxidisers, phosgene, phosphorousoxide, hydrogen phosphoride, Platinium catalyser, propinyl 
chloride, acids, sulphur dioxide, hydrogen sulphide, nitrogen oxides, nitrogen peroxide, tetra methyl amino 
ammonia (degradation) 
 
Ignition or ignitable gases: 
Borium, chlorine, pentaborane, phosphorous oxide, nitrous acid 
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Explosions/ explosible mixtures: 
Ammonium chlorite, (antimonwasserstoff (heat)), calcium, chlorine, chloroazide, chloro-dinitro benzene, 
chlorformamidiniumnitrat, chlorites, chloro benzene, chromium trioxide, chromylchloride, dichloroethane 
(liquid ammonia), dichlorooxide, di fluoro trioxide, gold, gold chloride, halogens, iodium , air, magnesium 
perchlorate, sodium hypochlorite (dry), oxidisers, pikrinic acid, mercury with water, mercury hypoiodid, 
oxygen, sulphur, silver, silver chloride & nitrate (under storage), tri chloro-nitrogen, sulfinyl chloride, 
haologenic tellurium compounds, hydrogenperoxide 
 
Generation of hazardous gases: 
Carbon monoxide (heat), methane (heat) both give hydrogen cyanide 
4 Hydrogen 
4.1 Summary of hazardous behaviour 
The main danger of hydrogen is its very high flammability. In the literature it is reported that high pressure 
releases often ignite the hydrogen release. The flame is very hot and nearly unvisible in daylight, the flame 
radiation is low. Delayed releases may lead to severe vapour cloud explosions.  
 
The NFPA rating for hydrogen is for health 0; for flammability 4 and for reactivity 0 
4.2 Classification 
Synonyms: water gas; protium 
CAS 1333-74-0 
EINECS  
RTECS  MW8900000 
NFPA ratings (0-4): Health 3, Flammability 1, Reactivity 0  
Dot no. UN 1049 flammable gas; UN 1966 Flammable gas ; UN 2034; UN2600 
  
4.3 Summary of important properties 
 
Chemical formula: H2  
Formula mass: 2.02 g/mole 
Melting pt. (°C)  -259.2 
Solubility in water 0.00017 g/100 mL; very slightly sol. 
Boiling pt. (°C) –252.8  
Flash point (°C): - 
Autoignition temp. (°C) 500 
Explosive limits (%)  (lower – upper) 4 –75 2 
Specific gravity (at b.p.): 0.6818 (kg/l) 
Vapor density  0.06952 kg/l;  
V.P. (mm Hg) - 
 
Hydrogen is a colourless and odourless gas 
4.4 Environmental hazards 
Hydrogen has no direct environmental effects, but several indirect effects as cooling of the lower strato-
sphere from its oxidation product water vapour and a slight decrease of the atmospheric hydroxyl free radical 
                                                     
2 Data taken from the Danish Emergency Management Agency: http://www.kemikalieberedskab.dk/ 
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concentration are being discussed at the moment. Most of the hydrogen is taken up by the biosphere and de-
graded by biological processes.  
4.5 Human hazards 
Hydrogen is not poisonous 
4.6 Fire hazards 
Ignition: Hydrogen is at the lower ignition limit ignited as easily as other fuels, though at higher concentra-
tions near the stoichiometric mixture the ignition energy decrease to very low energies. 
Fire emissions: water vapour  
Extinguishing: jet fire from pressurized release by closing off the source , cooling 
4.7 Compatibility with other compounds 
Hydrogen gives explosive mixtures with a number of substances such as oxygen, chlorine and fluorine . It 
also reacts with other halogenes, metal oxides, carbon and organic compounds. Reactive on metal catalysts. 
Hydrogen is generated by the reaction of acids with metals. 
5 LPG (Liquid Petroleum Gas, Propane/Butane) 
5.1 Summary of hazardous behaviour 
LPG is a very common fuel and has been intensively investigated to improve the overall safety. Storage may 
lead to BLEVES and vapour cloud explosions. 
  
The NFPA rating for LPG (propane & butane) is for health 1; for flammability 4 and for reactivity 0. 
5.2 Classification 
Synonyms: Liquefied petroleum gas; Flüssiggas 
CAS 68476-85-7 
EINECS  
RTECS    
NFPA ratings (0-4): Health 1, Flammability 4, Reactivity 0  
Dot no. UN 1075  
  
5.3 Summary of important properties  
Chemical formula: C3H6 – C4H10 
Formula mass:  42 – 58 g /mol 
Melting pt. (°C) –188 (propane) 
Solubility in water  all insoluable 
Boiling pt. (°C)  -42 (propane) 
Flash point (°C): -104 3 (propane) 
Autoignition temp. (°C) 470 / 450 (propane) 3 
Explosive limits (%)  (lower – upper) 2.1 –9.5 
Specific gravity (at b.p.): (kg/l) 
Vapor density   2.0196 kg/l;  
V.P. (kPa)  830 
 
LPG is a colourless, odorless mixture of gases or a liquid when under pressure of different compounds like  
butane, butene propane, propene 
5.4 Environmental hazards 
Water: insoluble in water, not dangerous to water 
                                                     
3 Data taken from the Danish Emergency Management Agency: http://www.kemikalieberedskab.dk/ 
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5.5 Human hazards 
Long term 
OSHA: the legal airborne permissible exposure limit (PEL) is 1000 ppm averaged over 8-hours workshift 
MAC (Propane) 1000  ml/m3 (ppm); 1800 mg/m3 
5.6 Fire hazards 
Ignition: extremely flammable (Classification symbol: Fx; Keep away from children, storage in a well-
ventilated room or area, keep away from ignition sources, smoking prohibited) 
 
Fire emissions: water, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide 
5.7 Compatibility with other compounds 
Explosion when mixed with air, hazardous reaction with bariumperoxide and chlordioxid 
6 Methanol 
6.1 Summary of hazardous behaviour 
Methanol is widely used in the daily life and industrial production, but is rather new to be considered as a 
future fuel. Methanol is slightly toxic, but is a liquid at ambient conditions. It ignites readily and as burning 
rather rapidly. 
 
The NFPA rating for methanol is for health 1; for flammability 3 and for reactivity 0 
6.2 Classification 
Synonyms: Methylalcohol 
CAS 67-56-1 
EINECS 2006596 
RTECS  
NFPA ratings (0-4): Health 1, Flammability 3, Reactivity 0  
Dot no. UN 1230 
  
6.3 Summary of important properties  
Chemical formula: CH3OH 
Formula mass: 32.04 g/mol 
Melting pt. (°C)  -98.9 
Solubility in water miscible 
Boiling pt. (°C) 64.7  
Flash point (°C): 12 / 11 1 
Autoignition temp. (°C) 455 / 464 4 
Explosive limits (%)  (lower – upper) 5.5 – 44 
Specific gravity (at b.p.): 0.6818 (kg/l) 
Vapor density  0.59 kg/l;  
V.P. (mm Hg): 2728 / 8000 hPa 
 
Methanol is a colourless liquid at room temperature with a characteristic fresh odour (2000 ppm). 
 
6.4 Environmental hazards 
Miscible with water, substance is dangerous to water (wassergefährdendere Stoff WGK 1) 
                                                     
4 Data taken from the Danish Emergency Management Agency: http://www.kemikalieberedskab.dk/ 
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6.5 Human hazards 
MAK-value: 200ml/m3, is absorbed through the skin. Poisonous and danger of irreversible harms by inhala-
tion, swallowing and skin contact 
 
6.6 Fire hazards 
Methanol is easy to ignite , burning with a blue flame 
6.7 Compatibility with other compounds 
Methanol reacts at room temperature violently with alkali metals generating hydrogen. Is giving explosive 
products when mixed with strong acids (e.g. nitric or perchlorate acid) or strong oxidisers. 
7 Natural gas / methane 
7.1 Summary of hazardous behaviour 
Natural gas (NG) is a slightly varying mixture of several gases. The main hazards are due to the high flam-
mability of the gas that may lead to explosions. Liquefied methane is very cold and may give frost bites 
when handled improperly. 
 
The NFPA rating for natural gas is 1 for health, 4 for flammability and 0 for reactivity 
7.2 Classification 
Synonyms: Erdgas (German); main component is Methane 
CAS 8006-14-2 (74-82-8) 
EINECS 200-812-7 
RTECS  
NFPA ratings (0-4): Health 1, Flammability 4, Reactivity 0  
Dot no. UN 1971 (pressurized); 1972 (liquid) 
7.3 Summary of important properties 
Chemical formula: CH4 
Formula mass: 16.04 g/mol 
Melting pt. (°C)  -184 
Solubility in water insoluable 
Boiling pt. (°C) 162 
Flash point (°C): - 
Autoignition temp. (°C) 595 
Explosive limits (%)  (lower – upper) 4.4 - 17 
Specific gravity : 0.717 (kg/l) 
 
Natural gas is a mixture of different gases with the main component methane usually with about 90 %. The 
composition changes after origin of the gas and therefore the properties may vary somewhat. In parentheses 
the properties of the pure main compound methane are listed. 
 
7.4 Environmental hazards 
Methane is recognized as a greenhouse gas 
7.5 Human hazards 
Methane is not toxic 
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7.6 Fire hazards 
Ignition: very easy to ignite at all ambient temperatures 
7.7 Compatibility with other compounds 
Incompatible with strong oxidisers eg. Chlorine and fluorine, mixture of liquid methane and liquid oxygen is 
explosive. 
8 Gasoline 
8.1 Summary of hazardous behaviour 
Gasoline is a mixture of easy ignitable hydrocarbons e.g containing pentane, hexane, heptane, octane etc.. It 
is widely used as a common fuel. It burns readily at ambient conditions with a yellow flame. It is dangerous 
to the water and soil environment. It may be depending on the actual composition be cancerous. 
The gasolines NFPA rating is 1 for health, 3 for flammability and 0 for reactivity. 
8.2 Classification 
Synonyms: - 
CAS 8032-32-4 106602-80-6 
EINECS 2324537 
RTECS  
NFPA ratings (0-4): Health 1, Flammability 3, Reactivity 0  
Dot no. UN 1203 
 
8.3 Summary of important properties 
Chemical formula: CnH2n+1 (n= 4 ..12) 
 
Formula mass: n.a.mixture 
Melting pt. (°C)   
Solubility in water insoluable 
Boiling pt. (°C) 38 - 103 
Flash point (°C): <-20 - 55 
Autoignition temp. (°C) >220 
Explosive limits (%)  (lower – upper) 0.6 - 8 
Specific gravity : 0.69 – 0.71 (kg/l) 
Vapour pressure: 51 – 404 hPa (20oC) 
Vapour density: denser than air, 2.7 – 5.0 
 
Gasoline is a mixture of a number of hydrocarbons ranging from C4 to C12. The odour is characteristic at 
300 ppm. 
8.4 Environmental hazards 
Gasoline is dangerous to water and a common soil pollutant 
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8.5 Human hazards 
Depending on the actual mixture gasoline may be cancerous . 
8.6 Fire hazards 
Ignition: gasoline mixture with a boiling point below 21oC is very easily ignitable, while gasolines in the 
boiling point range between 21 – 55 oC is classified as igniteable. 
 
8.7 Compatibility with other compounds 
Gasoline is generating explosive mixtures with air. 
 
 Annex B – Guideline for safe handling of 
ammonia in laboratories 
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1 Ammonia  
1.1 General about Ammonia 
Ammonia NH3 is a colourless, highly irritating gas with a sharp, suffocating 
odour. It dissolves easily in water and liquid ammonia evaporates quickly. It is 
commonly sold in liquid forms (dissolved in water or in pressurised tanks).  
Large amounts of ammonia are produced naturally in soil by bacteria, decaying 
plants and animals, and animal wastes. Ammonia is a key intermediate in the 
nitrogen cycle and is essential for many biological processes. 
For industrial purposes ammonia is synthesised from its elements nitrogen and 
hydrogen in large quantities. 
1.2 Use of Ammonia 
Ammonia is one of the most common used inorganic chemicals within the 
chemical industry. It is used for production of fertiliser, nitrates, explosives, 
nitric acid, amins, amids and textiles. Within the petrochemical industry it is 
used to neutralise acid in crude oil. 
In many areas Ammonia is used as protection gas e.g. by heat treatment of steel. 
The gas can be split up into its elements hydrogen and nitrogen, using a cata-
lyst. The thermodynamic properties of ammonia do it well suited as a medium 
in cooling systems, heat pumps and similar systems.  
1.3 Potential health hazards 
Exposure to anhydrous ammonia can cause blindness, lung damage, burns, or 
death. Symptoms include burning of the eyes, nose and throat after breathing 
even small amounts. 
Risk by respiration 
Ammonia is a cauterising gas. The toxic attack on the mucous membranes is 
due to the consideration, that the alkaline solution of water dissolves the albu-
men (protein) of the cell walls. 
Ammonia mainly attacks the upper respiratory passages, and eye exposure can 
cause serious corneal burns or blindness. Damage on the eye can occur up to a 
week after the exposition.  Gaseous ammonia attacks moist skin and can in 
higher concentrations (2-3%) give burning pains. Low concentration can result 
in indisposition, headache or coughing. High concentration can result in spasm 
in the larynx and long time exposition oedema in the lungs.  
• At concentration around 10-20 mg/m3 (15-30 ppm) the smell of ammonia is 
noticeable. 
• 70 mg/m3 (100 ppm) irritates the nose and can give burning feeling in the 
eyes.  
• 200-350 mg/ m3 (280-400 ppm) is tolerable up to 0.5-1 hour. 
• Concentration on 1200 mg/m3 (1700 ppm) is coughing causing and can 
result in severe damage by exposure less than 30 minutes. 
• Exposures at concentrations of 2500-4500 mg/m3 (3500-6400 ppm) can be 
dangerous to life at 0.5-1 hours of exposure. 
• Concentrations on 3500-7000 mg/m3 (5000-10000 ppm) are fatal at short 
exposure time (10-15 minutes). 
Risk by contact 
Ammonia in liquid form or as cold gas can cause frostbites and cauterising 
damage on skin and eyes. Liquid ammonia coming in contact with warmer ob-
jects will violent boil and splashing will occur. 
What is the treatment after exposure to anhydrous ammonia ? 
There is no specific treatment for the effects of anhydrous ammonia. Immediate 
first aid includes providing fresh air, oxygen and flushing with water.  
Most people recover from a single low exposure to anhydrous ammonia without 
any delayed or long-term effects. After a severe exposure, injury to the eyes, 
lungs, skin, or digestive system may continue to develop for 18 to 24 hours, and 
delayed effects primarily to the respiratory system or the eyes are possible. 
Anhydrous ammonia is not known to cause cancer. 
What tests can be done if a person has been exposed to anhydrous ammo-
nia? 
If a severe exposure has occurred, blood and urine analyses, chest x-rays, pul-
monary function testing and other tests may show whether the lungs have been 
injured. Testing is not needed in every case. Special eye examinations may also 
be conducted. 
What symptoms should persons be most concerned about? 
People who continue to experience coughing, difficulty breathing or shortness 
of breath, wheezing or high-pitched voice, chest pain or tightness, increased 
pain or a discharge from exposed eyes, increased redness or pain or a pus-like 
discharge in the area of a skin burn or stomach pain or vomiting should consult 
a doctor or a hospital. 
Preventive actions 
To be safe handling anhydrous ammonia:  
• Wear personal protective equipment, including:  
• goggles,  
• gloves,  
• long-sleeved shirt,  
• long pants,  
• and proper work shoes. 
• Have water supply close by.     and 
• Regularly inspect hoses and valves and replace them as needed.  
• Be careful not to fill a tank over 85 percent of capacity.  
• Bleed off hose pressure before disconnecting.  
• Stay clear of hose and valve openings.  
• Follow regulations when using equipment.  
1.4 Handling and storage 
Storage and transport 
Anhydrous ammonia is compressed to liquid form and is stored in tanks isolated 
or not isolated. Boiling point of anhydrous ammonia is –33 oC and can stay in 
liquid form under pressure at normal temperature. If the pressure tank fails so 
that the gas or liquid flows out, the temperature in the tank will decrease very 
rapid to –33 oC or lower. At the same time the pressure will drop to atmospheric 
pressure. If the ammonia has to be stored at atmospheric pressure it must be 
cooled down to a temperature lower than –33 oC. Tanks containing ammonia 
must be kept separated from other chemicals, especially oxidising gasses such 
as clorine, bromine, iodine and acid. 
 
Release of anhydrous ammonia 
From cooled atmospheric storage 
Liquid anhydrous ammonia at -33°C will pour out and form a liquid pool where 
it hits a surface (e.g. ground). While hitting the surface, it will evaporate vio-
lently (boil) until the underlying surface is cooled down. Mitigation will exist in 
limiting the pool: to spread (bund, pit), and to cover the pool with an isolating 
material (cloth), to prevent warm air to stimulate evaporation, and to limit re-
lease of vapour. Under no conditions water should be added to such a pool, be-
cause this causes violent boiling. Hazards related to this type of release are the 
toxic properties of the anhydrous ammonia vapour and frostbite due to the low 
temperatures of vapour and liquid.  
 
From pressurised storage 
Leakage from pressured storage may cause jets with excess speeds of over 100 
m/s and consisting of mixtures of small droplets and vapour. Due to mixing 
with air, all liquid in the jet can evaporate, causing further drop in temperature 
to -70°C. These jets can cause severe frostbite and cause toxic exposure. When 
the two-phase jet hits an object, the object becomes covered with a mixture of 
ice and liquid ammonia. 
The last effect can help to mitigate the release: by covering and “catching” the 
jet, using suitable sheets and wide, flexible hoses, evaporation can be limited 
and the liquid fraction of the jet (about 75% by mass) can be directed into a 
pool, where evaporation takes place at a lower rate. HydroCare, Landskrona, 
Sweden, has developed procedures and tools (hoses) for “re-condensing” am-
monia for these kind of spills1. Under no conditions water should be added to 
pools of liquid ammonia. If no other equipment is available, water curtains can 
be used (using special wide cone nozzles) to catch the ammonia that already has 
been evaporated. 
Fire and explosions risks 
Acids react with ammonia under development of heat. At larger amounts this 
heat development can have violent consequences. 
Ammonia burns in oxygen and nitrogen and water is developed. The gas, in cer-
tain concentrations, can burn and explode in a mixture with air. 
                                                     
1 An instruction video for this methodology is available. 
Ammonia and mercury can give explosive mixtures. Halogens e.g. chlorine and 
ammonia can give spontaneous explosions. Gas of ammonia burns in an atmos-
phere of gasses of nitric acid. Ammonia explodes in contact with hypo-chlorine 
acid. Gas of ammonia mixed with air react violent with potassium chlorate. 
Violent reactions and explosions happen when gas of ammonia or liquid ammo-
nia brings in contact with different halogen compounds. Liquid ammonia dis-
solves alkali metals 
1.5 Choice of materials 
Equipment Safety 
Equipment should be additives compatible and meet NH3 codes and standards. 
Any equipment replacement MUST be made "IN KIND" with the same materi-
als of construction and the same specifications.  
Only a limited amount of materials are recommended for use with ammonia. 
 
In the  catalog EGO from Brdr. Dahls  a list gives the information that the fol-
lowing metals can be used for ammonia. 
316 SS 
17-4 Ph stainless 
alloy 20 
hastelloy c 
Steel can be used for anhydrous ammonia but not for aqueous ammonia. 
 
Different findings from web pages concerning  “ corrosion+ammonia”  
 
Anhydrous and aqueous ammonia are completely different with regard to corro-
sion. Both types form a corrosive reaction with galvanised surfaces (Zinc) cop-
per, brass, bronze, aluminium and its alloys. 
 
Carbon steel, stainless steels and polyethylene have been used successfully as 
tank/piping materials. Storage tanks are typically designed and stamped as 
ASME (The American Society of Mechanical Engineers) pressure vessels due 
to the high vapour pressures typically encountered.  
 
Research papers have been written on stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of carbon 
steels in anhydrous ammonia service. When anhydrous ammonia is stored, 
tanks are also required to meet the special requirements of ANSI K61.1 (which 
involves stress relief of welded joints and other tank design requirements) 
 
 
2 Risk analysis of the system and 
process 
A risk analysis of a system is a structured going through of the system and its func-
tions, with special reference to identification of causes and consequences of un-
wanted events. The purpose of a risk analysis is to be able to implement safety sys-
tems that reduce risks for persons, equipment and the environment.  
The unwanted events in focus for the system in question are 
 
• Explosions 
• Fire 
• Leak of unwanted matters 
• Injury of persons 
 
A risk analysis consists of four parts: 
 
Plant description 
A description of the plant its functions, goals, operation, chemicals used, ware-
house, employed e.g. The description also include the placement of the plant 
and a drawing. 
Hazard identification 
A description of unwanted events or hazards in the plant if no control system 
was installed.  
This part is the most important part of the risk analysis and requires often the 
use of risk analysis methods to do a structured going through of the system to 
identify potential risks. 
As the unwanted events have been identified the consequence of these events 
have to be found and the root causes for the events assessed. 
To be able to determine the consequence of an event some help can be required 
in the form of dispersion models e.g. 
Safety systems 
What has been done to prevent the events to happen? 
If the consequence of an event is unacceptable for the persons or the environ-
ment, both regarding the consequence of the event but also the probability for 
that the event will happen, safety systems must be installed to prevent the 
events to happen.  
These safety systems must be described in the report. 
Safety systems can be automatic control systems, alarm systems, procedures 
e.g. 
Conclusion 
Final assessment of the safety of the plant 
 
3 References 
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Description of the plant 
 
The description must be short and clear. A drawing of the plant must be a part 
of the description. 
Detailed information of the plant can be given in an appendix. 
 
Project 
name: 
 
 
Date:  Responsible 
for  the report: 
 
 
Responsible for 
the design : 
 Responsible 
for the 
operation: 
 
 
Purpose: 
 
What are the plant used for ? 
 
Function :  
 
What is going on in the plant and how  ? 
 
Construction and placement : 
 
How is the plant build and how is it placed relative to the environment? 
 
Main data : 
 
 The most important data for the plant  must be described e.g. the size of the 
plant, temperatures, pressures , the amount of chemicals in the process and 
in the ware house.  
 
Operation : 
 
A description on the operation of the plant.  
Who runs the plant?  
What are their education ?  
Who is responsible for the operation ?  
When do it run? 
 Are there manual work connected to the operation? 
 
 
  
EVENTS 
 
In the following must be described possible unwanted events, their consequence 
and causes must be found and described. 
What can happen if no control and safety equipment or arrangements 
were installed? 
 
Hazard identification: 
 
Where are the most important dangers? (Dangerous chemicals, high 
temperature, high pressures .eg.) What can happen ? 
METHODS:  HAZOP, FMEA, Functional modelling 
 
 
 
If potential hazards are found continue in the next scheme else go to the 
conclusion. 
 
Consequence: 
 
What is the consequence of the identified hazards? (Exposure to people and 
environment) 
METHODS: Dispersion models and exposure calculations. 
 
 
 
 
If the consequences seem to be serious go to the next scheme else go to the 
conclusion. 
 
Failure analysis: 
 
Assessment of possible failures that lead to the identified events. 
METHODS: Fault tree analysis, FMEA, Human failures, HAZOP 
 
 
 
Safety systems 
 
In the following must be described which safety systems are installed or taken 
to prevent the identified possible events 
 
Supervisory systems: 
Describe which systems are installed to give information of system state and 
condition to be aware of abnormal situation and be able to prevent the un-
wanted events. 
 
Control systems: 
Describe the control systems installed, which prevent against unwanted 
situations and events. 
 
Procedures: 
Describe which written procedures exist for safe operation of the plant. 
 
Construction: 
Is there in the construction of the plant an in-build safety against unwanted 
events?  Requirements to the use of personals safety equipment? 
 
Conclusion 
 
Conclusion:  
Which events are identified?  
Which preventive installations or requirements exist to avoid these events?  
Uncertainties in the analysis? Lack of data? 
Evaluation 
 
 
Signature:  
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Annex C 
Allowable permeability of Ammonia tank 
 
 
wall 
max 10 ppm 
NH3 
0% NH3 100% NH3 
air 
(boundary 
layer) 
ammonia   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to avoid perception of ammonia, we have to guarantee that the concentration outside the 
wall of the tank is always below the smelling level. 
Ammonia permeates through the wall and through the boundary layer outside the wall. The 
concentration at the wall depends on the ratio between the diffusion resistance of the wall and the 
diffusion boundary. If the resistance of the wall is large compared to the resistance of the boundary 
layer, the concentration at the wall will be low and v.v. To guarantee a low concentration at the wall 
means that we have to look for the situation with the biggest resistance of the boundary layer. 
The diffusion through the boundary layer is proportional with the concentration gradient, the 
(molecular) diffusion coefficient for the ammonia-in-air diffusion, and inversely proportional to the 
thickness of the (laminar) boundary layer. 
If the air was completely still, the boundary layer would be infinitely thick, and the resistance 
thereby infinitely large. In practice, the air is moving always, even in a closed space (garage) due to 
ventilation and temperature differences. The problem is thus to find a realistic maximum thickness 
for this boundary layer. 
The first approach is to look for free convection motions. As ammonia is lighter than air, diffusion 
of ammonia will cause the ammonia/air mixture outside the  wall to be lighter than air, similarly as 
if the tank would be heating the air around it. 
Based on the similarity between mass transfer and heat transfer, we can calculate the mass transfer 
from a vertical flat plate under free convention due to concentration gradients. One can derive that 
the expressions are also valid for tubes with diameters corresponding to L/2.5, this is the nearest we 
can get to tank-shaped geometries using classical textbooks. We have set the wall concentration at 
10 ppm and the typical vertical length scale L at 1000 mm (diameter 400 mm). This yields a mass 
transfer rate of about 1.8⋅10-9 kg/m2s, see attached table. In other words, if the permeability 
through the wall itself is less than 1.8⋅10-9 kg/m2s, the concentration at the outside will be less 
than 10 ppm. Results are not very sensitive for the length scale, a length scale of 5 m 
(corresponding to a  tank diameter of 2 m) gives a mass transfer rate of 1.2⋅10-9 kg/m2s. 
 
Ref: ERG Eckert, RM Drake, Heat and Mass Transfer, 2nd ed. McGraw Hill, London, 1959, 
Chapter 11, Chapter 16 
 
free convenction due to concentration gradient
Molar mass of air M_air 29 kg/kmol
Molar mass of the gas M_gas 17 kg/kmol
Concentration at infinity C_infinity 0 mol/mol 0 kg/kg
Concentration at the wall C_wall 0.00001 mol/mol 5.862E-06 kg/kg
Temperature T 288 K
Standard air density rho_a_0 1.293 kg/m3
length scale (vertical dimension) L 1 m
density at infinity rho_inf 1.225656 kg/m3
density at the wall rho_wall 1.225651 kg/m3
Viscosity nu 1.50E-05 m2/s
Diffusion Coef gas-air D 2.50E-05 m2/s
Grashof Diffusion number Gr_D 1.80E+05
Schmidt Diffusion number Sc 6.00E-01
Laminar Nusselt Diffusion number Nu_D 1.01E+01 Gr<10+9
mass transfer Coeff h_D 2.52E-04 m/s
mas transfer rate m_flux 1.81E-09 kg/sm2
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Annex D – Failure and accident probabilities 
D.1 Vehicle release probabilities 
 
Table 1 Probabilities of consequences of accidents with ammonia powered passenger 
cars 
 
Table 2 Probabilities of consequences of accidents with LPG powered passenger cars 
 
D.2. Hazardous road transport failure probabilities 
The conditional failure and consequence probabilities for tank cars are based on the 
event tree model by Brockhof. The model is transferred into a Bayesian net. Bayesian 
nets are more flexible than event trees, several events can contribute to the same 
outcome. 
The model by Brockhof does not address explicitly the size of the release in case of a 
failure and the type of consequence. The following assumptions have been made in 
addition to the data presented by Brockhof: 
 
 
Consequence Scenario (chain of events) Expected 
frequency 
per 109 km 
Complete rupture of fuel tank with 
complete loss of contents 
1) Fuel tank fails on impact 
 0.015 
 2) Fuel tank fails due to overfilling and safety systems fail 0.0008 
Release through the 6 mm diameter 
fill line due to accident 
Tube connection fails and valves fail 
to close 0.053 
Release through 2 mm diameter 
connection between tank and 
evaporator.  
Tube connection between tank and 
evaporator fails and valve (safety 
system or between fails and valves 
fail to close failure of the evaporator 
0.104 
 
Evaporator/regulator fails during 
operation and causes failure of the 
system due to overpressure 
0.166 
Small hole (1 mm diameter) in the 
vapour line between evaporator and 
reformer 
Puncture in the tubing system, valves 
fail to close (or safety system fails to 
detect the puncture) 
1 
Release due to error during 
maintenance work 
Release through tube connection due 
to wrong operation while tank system 
is pressurised 
10 (estimate) 
Consequence Scenario (chain of events) Expected 
frequency 
per 109 km 
1) Fuel tank fails on impact 0.02 
Complete rupture of fuel tank 
followed by flash fire or explosion 2) Fuel tank fails due to overfilling 
and safety systems fail 0.016 
BLEVE of the tank Tank fails due to fire engulfment 1.7 
Release through a 6 mm diameter 
tube due to accident 
Tube connection fails and valves fail 
to close 2.6 
Low pressure vapour release  Tube connection fails and valves fail to close 0.3 
− Puncture leads to a large hole 
− Impact leading to failure of the tank (head-on, end-on or side-on) leads to complete 
failure (with instantaneous release of the whole contents of the tank) in 35% of the 
cases, and to a large hole in the remaining 65%. This is in agreement with data from 
the US as referenced by the AVIV study.  
− Failure due to fire impact leads to complete failure. 
And for flammable gases (LPG): 
− The presence of an initial fire leads to direct ignition (This means, in combination 
with the assumption above, that failure due to fire leads to a BLEVE) 
− Ignition in cases of failure due to puncture or impact follows the assumptions by the 
TNO LPG study for large holes, i.e. 10% direct ignition, 5% delayed ignition, 85% 
no ignition. (The TNO LPG study assumes higher ignition probabilities for 
instantaneous releases, but we assume that our (Brockhof’s) model covers this 
through the “failure due to fire impact” scenario) 
Figure 1 shows the Bayesian network. Abrasian is not contributing to major releases of 
thick-walled tanks. Results for accidents on rural roads are presented in Table 3 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Bayesian net describing the conditional probabilities of dangerous 
consequences of an accident with an LPG road tanker. 
 Table 3 Conditional probabilities of consequences of accidents with conventional (LPG) 
road tankers for rural roads (80 km/h speed limit). 
Consequence Scenario (chain of events) Conditional 
probability 
BLEVE (Fire ball due to  
rupture of tank, 
instantaneous release of 
contents and violent 
combustion) 
1) Impact fails tank completely + 
direct ignition  
2) Initial fire fails tank 
0.00498 
Instantaneous Cloud 
followed by an 
Unconfined Vapour 
Cloud Explosion (UVCE 
or flash fire) 
Impact fails tank completely + 
delayed ignition 
0.00025 
Unignited Vapour Cloud  Impact fails tank completely, no 
ignition 
0.00423 
Large Jet Fire (from large 
hole in tank) 
1) Puncture + direct ignition 
2) Impact fails tank partly + direct 
ignition 
0.00114 
Large flash fire 
(continuous release from 
large hole) 
1) Puncture + delayed ignition 
2) Impact fails tank partly + delayed 
ignition 
0.00054 
Large unignited vapour 
cloud 
1) Puncture, no ignition 
2) Impact fails tank partly, no ignition 
0.00917 
Minor releases   All “initial releases” in sofar these do 
not contribute to failure by fire 
impact. 
0.09917 
No Release  0.88052 
 
D.3. Loss of containment events at the refuelling station 
We assume that the delivery of ammonia or LPG takes place at existing refuelling 
stations where the main delivery exists of gasoline. But we will also assume that the 
physical lay-out of the refuelling station is such, that the delivery of gasoline, an any fire 
hazards resulting from that, does not interfere with the delivery of ammonia (or LPG) by 
tank car to the refuelling station. This requires among others that there is sufficient 
distance between the unloading of ammonia or LPG and the delivery of petrol to the 
consumer cars. Also, the “pit” that is recommended for the unloading bay of the 
ammonia tank car should be constructed in such a way, that leaked petrol from the 
station cannot run into this pit. 
 
Scenarios related to the presence and unloading of the tank car 
The basis for the Loss of Containment events related to the tank car at the refuelling 
station are the generic failure rates for road tankers in an establishment according to the 
purple book (Committee for the Prevention of Disasters). This data includes catastrophic 
failure of the tank, and failure of unloading hoses and pipes. The data is corrected for the 
actual time that the road tanker is present at the refuelling station, about one hour per 
visit, and with 55, 37 and 39 visits per year for ammonia, LPG and gasoline, 
respectively. The expected frequency of the different Loss of Containment scenarios is 
listed in Table 4. 
 
Contribution to catastrophic failure (BLEVE) by hose- and pipe failure 
For the flammable fuels (LPG, gasoline) we anticipate that failure on the unloading 
equipment (hoses and pipelines/unloading arms) can lead to flame impingement on the 
tank, thus causing a catastrophic BLEVE. A blocking system is assumed present, with a 
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) of 0.01, in case of hose- or pipe failure, and we 
expect that the likelihood of a fire duration that can cause failure of the tank is 0.2 for 
ruptures, and 0.01 for leaks. Probability of ignition is 0.5 for large (>10 kg/s) LPG 
releases (ruptures), 0.2 for small LPG releases, and 0.065 for gasoline releases. It should 
be noted that the LPG study (TNO) assumes a frequency of a tank car BLEVE at a 
refuelling station to be 2⋅10-5 per year for a throughput of 500 tonnes per year (our study 
assumes about 650 tonnes per year). Based on the estimated frequency of spontaneous 
failure of a road tanker of about 10-6 per year and the likelihood of fire due to failure of 
pipe and hose connections, we arrive at a realistic estimate of about 2⋅10-6 for a tank car 
BLEVE, see table 4.  
 
Catastrophic failure of the storage tank 
The storage tank (the pressure tank for LPG or ammonia) is expected to be 
located underground. This would remove the possibility for fire impingement 
(thus BLEVE for LPG storage) and external impact. Using practice for 
underground storage tanks for LPG in the Netherlands, the expected 
frequency for catastrophic failure for above-ground tanks is reduced. We 
assume that an instantaneous release of the full capacity of the tank is 5⋅10-6 
per year, see table 4. It should be noted that the frequency estimate of 
“spontaneous” catastrophic failure (i.e. complete failure without external 
impact) of pressure vessels in the “Purple Book” and similar data sources are 
based on considerations of the absence of observation of these failures 
compared to the total years of operation of these type of vessels. 
 
Table 4 Expected frequencies (per year) of Loss of Containment events at the refueling 
station. The numbers in italics are summed together into the scenario “all causes”. 
  NH3 LPG   Gasoline   
Loss of 
Containment 
scenario 
"Purple 
Book" 
Toxic 
cloud 
BLEVE Flammable 
cloud 
Jet fire BLEVE Flammable 
cloud 
Pool Fire
All causes   1.8E-07   3.5E-08   
Instantaneous tank 
car release 5.0E-07 3.1E-09 8.4E-10 1.3E-09  0 4.4E-08  
Continuous release 
large connection 5.0E-07 3.1E-09 8.4E-10 1.3E-09  0 2.2E-09  
Full bore hose 3.5E-02 2.2E-06 1.5E-07 7.4E-07 5.9E-07 2.0E-08 1.5E-06 8.1E-08 
Leak hose 3.5E-01 2.2E-05 3.0E-08 1.2E-05 2.9E-06 1.0E-08 1.5E-05 1.0E-06 
Full bore arm 2.6E-04 1.7E-08 1.1E-09 5.6E-09 4.4E-09 1.5E-10 1.1E-08 6.1E-10 
Leak arm 2.6E-03 1.7E-07 2.2E-10 8.9E-08 2.2E-08 7.6E-11 1.1E-07 7.5E-09 
Fire under tank 
(only flammable) 1.0E-06 0 4.2E-09   4.4E-09   
Instantaneous 
storage tank failure 
5.0E-07 + 
5.0E-071 5.0E-07  5.0E-07     
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1 5.0E-07/year for instantaneous release including BLEVE, and 5.0E-07 /year for release of 
total contents in 10 mins. 
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Preface 
This annex to report “Safety assessment of ammonia as a transport fuel” Risø-R-
1504(EN) describes in detail the background of the consequence analysis for the safety 
assessments in the main report. 
The consequence models used are described in chapter 1. The calculations for the 
releases from vehicles, road transport of fuel and releases from refuelling stations are 
described in chapters 2 to 4, respectively. 
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 1 Consequence models 
This chapter contains an overview and short descriptions of the consequence models 
that have been applied.   
1.1 Outflow models 
1.1.1 “RELIEF” model 
The “RELIEF” model has been used to estimate the release flows and duration from 
vessels through (relatively small) pipes and holes (Brinkhof and others, 1995). The 
model accounts for 2-phase behaviour and pressure loss through pipe ends. The model 
has been used both for releases from vapour and liquid fase in the storage and transport 
vessels (including the tanks in the user cars) for pressurised ammonia and propane. The 
maximum flow rates have been used for the subsequent jet- and dispersion calculations. 
1.1.2 Vapour outflow 
Pure vapour outflow through orifices (including small holes in pressure tanks) have been 
either calculated using the RELIEF model (see above) or using Fliegner’s flow rate 
formula: 
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q: flow rate (kg/s) 
A: hole area (m2) 
Cd: contraction coefficient 
P0: storage pressure (Pa) 
T0: Storage temperature (K) 
µ: molar mass (kg/kmol) 
κ: Poisson constant (Cp/Cv) 
Pa: ambient pressure (outside the vessel) 
1.1.3 Liquid outflow 
Outflow of non-boiling liquids from vessels (e.g. petrol) is calculated using the formula 
from the so-called Yellow Book (Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, 1997), 
chapter 2.5: 
Lad PPCAq ρ⋅−⋅⋅⋅= )(2  
q: flow rate (kg/s) 
A: hole area (m2) 
Cd: contraction coefficient 
P: sum of hydrostatic pressure at the hole plus any pressure at the top of the 
liquid level (Pa) 
ρL: liquid density (kg/m3) 
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Pa: ambient pressure (outside the vessel) 
1.1.4 Pool evaporation 
Evaporation of liquids (such as petrol) from the surface is performed using the models 
provided by the Yellow Book , chapter 3.5. In the case of the release of pressurised gases 
(such as pressurised ammonia and propane), part of the release may form a pool, with 
subsequent evaporation.  
1.1.5 Instantaneous release - ACE 
If a pressurised vessel instantaneously fails, the pressurised contents are depressurised 
rapidly. The phenomena during depressurisation are very complex and have been subject 
to various small- and medium scale experiments. The approach used here is the ACE-
model (Airborne Concentration Estimate) (Deaves and others, 2001) and (Gilham and 
others, 1999) up to the end of the explosive growth state. From that point onwards, the 
SLaM model (Shallow Layer Model) is used to estimate the turbulent expansion, 
dispersion and drift by the wind (Ott and Nielsen, 1996). The SLaM model takes the 
following cloud conditions at the end of the explosive growth state from the ACE model 
as input: 
− Asymptotic cloud volume at the end of the explosive growth phase; 
− Cloud radius at the end of the explosive growth phase; 
− Turbulence intensity in the cloud at the end of the explosive growth phase (which is 
typically between 25 and 35 m/s) 
1.2 Dispersion models 
Jet releases from relatively small holes (punctures and ruptured pipes) are calculated 
using the jet/plume model of the GreAT package (Ott, 1999). The model produces short 
time-averaged concentration predictions. 
For instantaneous releases from ruptured pressurised tanks, the shallow layer model 
SLAM has been used , with the results of the ACE model as input for the initial cloud 
(see above). 
Plumes drifting with the wind do not affect the whole surroundings, only the sector to 
which the wind will blow the cloud. This is included in the risk calculations as the 
conditional probability of being in the affected sector. The conditional risk is then α/2π. 
Sector angle  α 
The consequence calculations are performed for weather conditions D2 (neutral stability, 
2 m/s wind speed at 10 m height), unless conditions at D5 (5 m/s wind speed) produced 
longer effect distances (for instantaneous releases, higher wind speeds tend to carry the 
hazardous concentrations further away) 
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 1.3 Fires and explosion 
1.3.1 Fireball – BLEVE 
Fireballs, often described as a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) 
occur when tanks with liquid-pressurised gasses instantaneously rupture and when the 
flammable material is ignited immediately. The explosive flashing causes intensive 
mixing of the material with air, supporting the burning rate. The hot, burning material 
rises in the air, carrying with it still cold droplets (the flashing causes the material to cool 
to the boiling point). Propane and butane and similar hydrocarbons cause fireballs with 
intense radiation. Though the initial rupture initiates shockwaves that can cause damage, 
the main hazard of hydrocarbon fireballs is the intense heat radiation. 
The calculation of fireball, its size, rise and radiation impact are calculated using the 
model described in the Yellow Book, chapter 6. Some of the iterative expressions to 
estimate atmospheric transmissivity of radiation (depending on humidity and carbon-
dioxide concentration) are simplified to allow the calculation to be performed by a 
simple spreadsheet. 
1.3.2 Flash fire 
Flash fires occur when flammable gas is mixed with air before it is ignited (delayed 
ignition). In 60% of the cases with delayed ignition, there will be no pressure effects 
(Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, 1999). Burning will pass through the 
premixed cloud with a fast flame-front velocity. The area (volume) affected by the flash 
fire is estimated to correspond to half of the lower flammability level (LFL) of the gas as 
predicted by a dispersion calculation. The factor one-half is chosen to account for 1) that 
dispersion models do not explicitly estimate concentration fluctuations, i.e. ignitable 
“pockets” of gas can exist outside the calculated LFL contour, and 2) during mixing, the 
cloud will expand due to the temperature rise (a factor of 2 in concentration corresponds 
to a double volume, i.e. a temperature rise of the flammable part of the cloud to 300 
degree C on average). 
Flash fires can develop into vapour cloud explosions (VCE). The overpressures caused 
by the burning depend on the flame speed in the cloud. The flame speed is increased by 
turbulence in the cloud and the obstruction of the expansion by obstacles. Flammable 
clouds over open, flat grounds develop seldom into a VCE. 
For the ignition probability, a probability of 50% in one minute and longer is taken, 
which is thought to be relevant for traffic situations, see the Purple book, . For clouds 
passing in short times, the following expression is applied:  
)1( 120/tignitiondelayed eP
−−=  
with t the time of the cloud to be diluted below ½LFL in seconds. 
1.3.3 Pool fire 
Fires for non-boiling liquids, either bunded or with free boundaries, are called pool fires. 
If the liquids are “simple” substances, like pentane, heptane, etc., the formation of toxic 
combustion products can be ignored and the main hazard is the heat radiation. Heat 
radiation is predicted using a model described in (Rew and Hulbert, 1996), again slightly 
simplified to allow the use of a simple spreadsheet. 
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1.3.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) 
The overpressure caused by vapour cloud explosions (from methane, propane or 
hydrogen releases) depends on the combustion energy in the cloud and the obstruction 
by obstacles around the ignition point. The most appropriate model is the Multi-Energy 
Model as described in the Yellow Book, chapter 5 . According to the Purple Book , 40% 
of delayed ignitions cause explosions. The overpressure effects depend on the 
obstruction. We assume that only one third of the cloud will be in an obstructed region 
that will lead to the strongest overpressure effects (blast strength 10 in the Multi-Energy 
Model), and that this region will be at two thirds of the maximum downwind distance to 
½LFL. This can be justified by the fact that the road will be an unobstructed area for the 
relatively small cloud around a (passenger) vehicle, and that the transport routes to 
refuelling stations are likely to be rural, open roads. Only if fatality distances are larger 
than one third of the maximum downwind distance to ½LFL, the explosion effects will 
be larger than the effects of the flash fire. 
1.4 Damage models 
1.4.1 Toxicity 
The toxic impact of ammonia is modelled using a Probit function. For a description of 
the Probit function see , (Committee for the Prevention of Disasters, 1992), (Lees, 1996). 
The Probit function is directly related to the fraction of the population that will be fatally 
injured. A Probit outcome of 5 corresponds to 50% fatality (cf. LC50). The Probit 
function applied in this project for ammonia is , (Arts and others, 2000): 
)ln(5.16Pr 2tC+−=  
Where C is the concentration (in ppm) and t is the time of exposure (in min.). Following 
a study on the effect on short duration exposure and the effect of fluctuating 
concentrations  it was recommended to use as a minimum exposure duration in this 
Probit expression 1 min. That means that even if the exposure to the toxic concentration 
in the passing cloud is less than 1 min., then 1 min. is still used in the expression (As the 
time of passage of the ammonia cloud from a ruptured tank in a passenger car is only 
about 20 s, the results are expected to be conservative). 
1.4.2 Heat radiation 
Likewise toxicity, the impact of radiation on people is predicted using a Probit function. 
The Probit function used is,  
)ln(56.238.36Pr 3/4 tqrad ⋅+−=  
Here qrad is the radiative heat flux (W/m2) and t the exposure time (s). Radiative heat 
fluxes over 35 kW/m2 are supposed to be fatal irrespective of the exposure duration. For 
the exposure time a maximum of 20 s is used to reflect that people can escape from the 
fire . (It can be questioned whether we should account for the fact that on an accident 
scene, some injured people cannot escape). The actual duration of e.g. a BLEVE from a 
vehicle LPG tank is some 2 s.  
Heat radiation less than 12.5 kW/m2 is not expected to be fatal, as people will have the 
possibility to escape from the fire. 
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 1.4.3 Flash fire 
All people that are present in the cloud at the moment of the flash fire are expected to 
die. The boundaries for the flash fire are the ½LFL (LFL = Lower Flammability Level) 
concentration limits of the cloud. ½LFL instead of LFL is used corresponding to current 
practice to account for concentration fluctuations not predicted by the (time) averaged 
dispersion models and for the fact that the gas cloud will expand when burning. 
1.4.4 Explosion 
Pressure effects on people outdoors can cause fatal injury by lung damage, impact of the 
head or impact of the whole body (ear damage can also be caused, but this will not be 
fatal, and this will be ignored in this study). Probit functions for these injury types are 
proposed in the Green Book , depending on the overpressure and impulse from the 
pressure wave. It is noted that the criterion of fatality at peak pressures over 0.3 barg 
according to the  gives larger consequence distances than these Probit functions. 
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 2 Results of consequence analysis - Vehicles 
2.1 Vehicle accidents with ammonia 
The following Table 1 shows the different types of ammonia releases.  
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
Complete rupture of fuel tank due to 
accident or overfilling 
53 kg total, 18 
kg 
instantaneously 
in the air 
instantaneous 
emission 
followed by pool 
evaporation 
19 m 
Release through the 6 mm diameter 
fill line due to accident 
0.27 kg/s, total 
mass released 50 
kg 
decrease after 
150 s, total 
duration 230 s 
17 m 
Release through 2 mm diameter 
connection between tank and 
evaporator. This includes rupture of 
the line between evaporator and 
reformer and failure of the evaporator 
0.03 kg/s, total 
mass released 50 
kg without 
intervention 
Release rate is 
reduced to 10% 
after 2000 s 
3.7 m 
Small hole (1 mm diameter) in the 
vapour line between evaporator and 
reformer 
0.003 kg/s > 1 hour without 
intervention 
0.3 m 
Table 1 Overview of release scenarios for ammonia-powered vehicles 
2.1.1 Consequences for complete rupture 
The consequence assessment is based on a100 l tank filled to 78% by volume, which 
corresponds to a total content of 53 kg ammonia. A complete rupture will cause a part of 
the contents to flash from liquid to vapour. This amounts to about 15% of the tank’s 
contents. The explosive expansion will force droplets at boiling temperature to be 
entrained in the vapour cloud while others are pressed to the ground and other fixed 
obstacles. The total mass remaining airborne is estimated to be almost 19 kg, the rest will 
form a cold evaporating liquid pool below the ruptured tank.  
The initial cloud formed by the explosive expansion is estimated to be a semi-sphere of 
about 9 m3 and a diameter of 5 m. From here, a dispersion model calculates entrainment 
of air, slumping and movement with the wind. Figure 1 shows the concentration decay 
(the maximum concentration observed at positions on the cloud centreline while moving) 
and the corresponding expected fatality rate for unprotected persons at those positions. 
At the lowest wind speed, the cloud passes the position at 40 m downwind within 60 s, 
and the fatality rate is based on the maximum concentration in combination with a 1 min. 
exposure time. The actual dose (integrated value of concentration over time) is less this 
assumed exposure, providing a conservative (safe) estimate of fatality. The violent 
mixing during the expansion causes the cloud to be mixed to concentrations almost 
below the 100% fatality level. 
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Figure 1 Maximum concentration and fatality rate after an instantaneous release of 
ammonia from a vehicle tank at 2 and 5 m/s wind speed. This assessment only includes 
the initial cloud. 
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Figure 2 Results of the dispersion calculations of the ammonia evaporating from the 
ground pool after an instantaneous rupture of the vehicle tank at 2m/s wind speed. 
The remaining liquid will rapidly (in about 1 s) spread out to its final size of 9 m2 on the 
ground. From this ammonia will evaporate, starting at a relatively high evaporation rate 
of about 1kg/s over the first few seconds. This evaporation will decrease due to the 
cooling of the ground, after 1 min., the evaporation rate is about 0.2 kg/s. It will take 3 
minutes for all the ammonia to be evaporated from the ground.  
The ammonia that evaporates from the ground is, even at its boiling point, lighter than 
air and will raise upwards (in contrast to two-phase mixed jets of ammonia, that become 
dense due to the cold air). Dispersion calculations have been performed, using the 
evaporation averaged over the first minute. Fatality calculations assume a 2 min 
exposure. It turns out that the ammonia from the pool causes the largest fatality distances 
in this case, see Figure 2. 
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 2.1.2 Pressurised liquid release from a 6 mm rupture 
This scenario arises from the possibility of a failure of the tubing to fill the tank, while 
the systems to shut off the flow to the tube also fail. The assumption is that in that case 
the total content of the tank is released through the rupture, driven by the internal 
pressure of the tank. It is assumed that the outflow will be as liquid being the worst case. 
As the filling tube is connected to the top of the tank, this means we assume that the car 
is overturned. In the course of the release, the pressure will drop. The outflow rate as a 
function of time (result from the RELIEF model) is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 Outflow as function of time for a 6 mm rupture and liquid outflow. 
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Figure 4 Result for dispersion calculations for a release of liquefied ammonia through a 
6 mm hole at 2 m/s wind speed. 
The dispersion calculations are shown in Figure 4. 
2.1.3 Pressurised liquid release from a 2 mm rupture 
This scenario is representative for all ruptures in the connection between the tank and the 
reformer. As the tubing between the tank and the vaporiser is thought to be a thin 2 mm 
tube, the flow through this tube will restrict the flow in all cases. Conditions are similar 
as for the 6 mm rupture. In normal (upright) position the tube takes liquid ammonia from 
the bottom of the tank. Results are shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 Results of dispersion calculations for a liquid ammonia release through a 2 mm 
hole at 2 m/s wind speed. 
2.1.4 Small vapour release  
This scenario represents a small (1 mm) puncture of the low-pressure part of the 
connection between the vaporiser and the reformer. In this case ammonia vapour will be 
released (which is a buoyant, lighter-than-air gas), see Figure 6 
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Figure 6 Results from dispersion calculations for an ammonia vapour release from a 1 
mm hole at 1.5 barg at 2 m/s wind speed. 
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 2.2 Vehicle accidents with LPG 
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
Complete rupture of fuel tank due to 
accident or overfilling, followed by 
flash fire or vapour cloud explosion 
23 kg total, 15,7 
kg 
instantaneously 
in the air 
Instantaneous 
emission 
followed by pool 
evaporation. 
Cloud passes in 
ca 10 s. 
30 m 
BLEVE of the tank 23 kg Fireball duration 
2 s 
13.7 m 
Liquid release through a 6 mm 
diameter tube due to accident 
0.25 kg/s, total 
mass released 23 
kg 
90 s 18.9 m 
Vapour release from a 6 mm 
diameter tube due to accident 
0.04 kg/s, total 
mass released 23 
kg without 
intervention 
Ca. 10 min. 
(without 
intervention) 
8.8 m 
Low pressure vapour release from a 6 
mm tube 
0.008 kg/s, total 
mass released 23 
kg without 
intervention 
Ca 45 min. 
(without 
intervention) 
3.2 m 
Table 2 Overview of release scenarios for LPG-powered vehicles 
2.2.1 Consequences for complete rupture of LPG tank 
This consequence assessment is very similar to the one presented for ammonia in section 
2.1.1, except that the damage will be caused by the possible combustion of LPG (flash 
fire) in stead of toxic impact. The assessment is based on a 56 l tank filled to 80% by 
volume, which corresponds to a total content of 23 kg propane (propane is used to 
represent LPG). A complete rupture will cause a part of the contents to flash from liquid 
to vapour. This amounts to about 26% of the tank’s contents. The explosive expansion 
will force droplets at boiling temperature to be entrained in the vapour cloud while others 
are pressed to the ground and other fixed obstacles. The total mass remaining airborne is 
estimated to be almost 16 kg; the rest will form a cold evaporating liquid pool below the 
ruptured tank.  
The initial cloud formed by the explosive expansion is estimated to be a semi-sphere of 
about 3 m3 and a diameter of 4 m. From here, a dispersion model calculates entrainment 
of air, slumping and movement with the wind. Figure 7 shows the concentration decay 
(the maximum concentration observed at positions on the cloud centreline while moving) 
and the corresponding expected fatality rate for unprotected persons, which is 10% 
(being the chance of ignition for a cloud passing within ca 10 s) in the cloud where 
concentration is over ½LFL. 
An explosion can cause fatalities within a radius of 6 m from the centre of the explosion. 
with reference to the assumptions explained in section 1.3.4, this means that this will not 
increase the individual risk as compared to the flash fire. 
The remaining liquid will rapidly (in about 1 s) spread out to its final size of 2.5 m2 on 
the ground. From this LPG will evaporate, starting at a relatively high evaporation rate of 
about 2 kg/s over 5 seconds. After this, the just over 7 kg of LPG on the ground will be 
evaporated. As this is a fast process, the release is almost instantaneous, and it appears, 
that the calculations with the instantaneous release model predicts lower concentrations 
than the continuous model, which would produce less reliable results in this case, see 
Figure 8 
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Figure 7 Maximum concentration and fatality rate after an instantaneous release of LPG 
from a vehicle tank at 2 and 5 m/s wind speed. This assessment only includes the initial 
cloud.  
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Figure 8 Results of the dispersion calculations of the LPG evaporating from the ground 
pool after an instantaneous rupture of the vehicle tank at 2 m/s wind speed. Calculations 
are performed with the instantaneous SLAM model 
2.2.2 BLEVE of LPG car tank 
A complete failure due to fire impact of the LPG tank will lead to a so-called BLEVE or 
fireball. All 23 kg of the LPG inside the 56 l tank will be involved in the fireball. The 
radius of the fireball is about 9 m. The fireball duration is very short, some 2 s. The 
Probit function to estimate fatality due to heat radiation uses a lower exposure limit of 20 
s. In this case we have stretched the validity to 10 s, this indicates that outside the radius 
of the fire ball the likelihood for fatal injuries due to radiation has dropped to values less 
than 22%. As other effects (direct flame engulfment, burning LPG droplets) will 
contribute to injury close/below the fireball, we consider the estimates based on 10 s. 
exposures realistic. 
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Figure 9 Estimated fatality rate in case of a BLEVE of an LPG tank in a car. 
2.2.3 Liquid release through a 6 mm diameter tube 
If a tube with ID 6 mm, connected to the liquid space of the LPG tank, ruptures (e.g. the 
tube from the tank to the evaporator/pressure reducer, or the tube tot the engine while the 
pressure reducer fails), the contents of the tank will be released. Initially, the release rate 
will be almost 0.25 kg/s, and this rate reduces only slowly during the 90 s it takes to 
release all liquid from the tank (the outflow behaviour is qualitatively the same as in 
Figure 3). It is assumed that the material is released in an horizontal jet. The distance to 
the ½LFL-concentration is almost 19 m, see Figure 10. 
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Figure 10 Concentration and probability of fatality due to flash fire in the propane jet 
due to liquid release through the 6 mm tubing at 2 m/s wind speed. 
2.2.4 High-pressure vapour release from a 6 mm diameter tube  
This release occurs when a 6 mm tube connected to the vapour space of the LPG tank 
(e.g. the filling tube) ruptures, and the full tank pressure forces the vapour through the 
rupture. The release rate will be about 0.04 kg/s. This would empty the tank in about 10 
min. The  
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Figure 11 Concentration and probability of fatality due to flash fire in the propane jet 
due high-pressure vapour release through the 6 mm tubing at 2 m/s wind speed. 
2.2.5 Low-pressure vapour release from a 6 mm tube 
This release occurs when the 6 mm tube connection between vaporiser/pressure 
reduction valve ruptures, and the pressure reduction system keeps functioning. This 
means that the pressure forcing the LPG out of the tube is only 0.2 bar (gauge). The 
outflow rate is almost 0.008 kg/s, and this would take ca. 45 min. to empty a full tank if 
no intervention takes place. Results are presented in Figure 12 
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Figure 12 Concentration and probability of fatality due to flash fire in the propane jet 
due low-pressure vapour release through the 6 mm tubing at 2 m/s wind speed. 
18  Risø-R-1504(EN) Annex E 
 2.3  Vehicle accidents with gasoline 
Table 3 Accident scenarios for a gasoline tank vehicle. 
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
BLEVE of the tank 37 kg released 2 s 7.9 m 
Pool evaporation with possible flash 
fire /Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) 
37 kg released ca 2.5 min. at 2 
m/s wind speed 
5.7 m/7.1 m for 
VCE 
Pool fire 37 kg 50 s 4.5 m 
2.3.1 Gasoline tank BLEVE  
This scenario can occur when a gasoline tank is engulfed in fire in a burning car, and 
ruptures. It is assumed that the tank contains 37 kg gasoline that is heated up to 200 
degree C. when the rupture occurs. A fireball will occur with a radius of about 11 m. 
at a height of 21 m above the ground. As in section 2.2.2, we have used exposure 
duration of 10 s in the Probit function, though the BLEVE duration is about 2 s. This 
will account for contribution to injury close to the fireball from burning droplets. 
The fatality is presented in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 Estimated fatality rate in case of a BLEVE of a gasoline tank in a car at 2 m/s 
wind speed. 
2.3.2 Pool evaporation of gasoline from a ruptured tank 
When a gasoline tank is ruptured, its contents of ca 56 l will spread out to a pool of about 
11 m2 in a very short time (1 s) on a flat surface like tarmac. Depending on wind 
conditions, the gasoline will evaporate at a rate between 0.24 kg/s (at 2 m/s wind speed) 
and 0.51 kg/s (at 5 m/s wind speed). Dispersion of this evaporated gasoline is calculated 
using the GReAT dense-gas model; results are shown in Figure 14 for 2 m/s wind speed, 
which results in the largest effect distances. Fatality is based on the assumption that 
probability of ignition of gasoline vapour is 50%. Hexane is used as the representative 
component of gasoline. The heavy cloud contains about 2.7 kg of gasoline within the 
½LFL contour.  
The effects of an explosion can be fatal to a distance of 3.3 m from the centre of the 
explosion, so the total effect distance will be 7.1 m in case of explosion.  
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Figure 14 Dispersion of gasoline that originates from an evaporating pool at 2 m/s wind 
speed. 
2.3.3 Gasoline pool fire 
Instead of an evaporating pool, the vapour immediately above the pool can be ignited, 
and a pool fire will occur. In this case, all gasoline will burn in less than a minute. For 
the injury estimates we assume exposure over 20 s; (we assume people to be able to 
escape from the fire in that time). The effect distance is about 4.5 m from the fire. 
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Figure 15 Heat flux and fatality around a gasoline pool fire. 
2.4 Vehicle accidents with methanol  
Table 4 Accident scenarios for a methanol tank vehicle. 
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
BLEVE of the tank 41 kg released 2 s 5.5 m 
Pool evaporation with possible flash 
fire and vapour cloud explosion 
41 kg released ca 10 min (at 2 
m/s wind speed) 
4 
Pool fire 41 kg   
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 2.4.1 Methanol tank BLEVE  
This scenario can occur when a methanol tank is engulfed in fire in a burning car, and 
ruptures. It is assumed that the tank contains 41 kg methanol that is heated up to 200 
degree C. when the rupture occurs. A fireball will occur with a radius of about 11 m. at a 
height of 22 m above the ground. As in section 2.2.2, we have used exposure duration of 
10 s in the Probit function, though the BLEVE duration is about 2 s. This will account 
for contribution to injury close to the fireball from burning droplets. The radiation from 
the methanol fireball is very low compared to LPG or gasoline., so the predicted fatality 
rate close to the incident is very low. We assume that at a distance less than half the 
fireball radius, impact form the event will be fatal. The result is presented in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16 Estimated fatality rate in case of a BLEVE of a methanol tank in a car. 
2.4.2 Pool evaporation of methanol from a ruptured tank 
This scenario is similar to the one for gasoline described in 2.3.2. Depending on wind 
conditions, the methanol will evaporate at a rate between 0.06 kg/s (at 2 m/s wind speed) 
and 0.11 kg/s (at 5 m/s wind speed). Dispersion of the evaporated methanol is shown in 
Figure 17 for 2 m/s wind speed, which results in the largest effect distances. Fatality is 
based on the assumption that probability of ignition of methanol vapour is 50%.  
Explosion effects are fatal up to about 1 m from the centre of the explosion, so this will 
not extent the effect distances of the flash fire. 
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Figure 17 Dispersion of methanol that originates from an evaporating pool at 2 m/s 
wind speed. 
2.4.3 Methanol pool fire 
This scenario is similar as the one described for gasoline in section 2.3.3. In this case, all 
methanol will burn in about three minutes. The pool diameter is about 3.7 m For the 
injury estimates we assume exposure over 20 s; (we assume people to be able to escape 
from the fire in that time). The effect distance is about 4.5 m, one meter outside the fire 
itself, see Figure 18. 
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Figure 18 Heat flux and fatality around a methanol pool fire 
 
2.5 Vehicle accidents with hydrogen 
The scenario for comparing the use of ammonia with hydrogen is pressure storage (600 
bar) at ambient temperature. A 100 l pressure vessel will contain about 5.5 kg hydrogen, 
which has a comparable energy content as about 40 kg of methanol and a 100 l ammonia 
tank.  
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 Table 5 Accident scenarios for a hydrogen-powered vehicle. 
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
Rupture/explosion of the tank 5.5 kg released 1 s 8 m 
Release through 6 mm ruptured 
piping followed by flash fire or 
explosion 
0.6 kg/s over the 
first 5 s. 
15 s (the flow is 
reduced to less 
than 10% of the 
initial flow) 
30 
Release through 3 mm fitting 
followed by flash fire or explosion 
0.23 kg/s over 
the first 5 s 
40 s 20 
Rupture/explosion of the tank follows only when there is a fire engulfment of the tank, 
longer than 10 min while the pressure relief systems have failed. A fireball will form of 
about 5 m radius and rise to about 15 m height. Pressure effects will be fatal to a distance 
of 5 m from the tank. It is difficult to estimate the heat radiation from the fireball. 
Hydrogen has a very low emissivity, but other substances may be ejected in the fireball. 
If 20% of the heat of the fireball is emitted as radiative heat, the 35 kW/m2 heat flux is 
exceeded up to 8 m from the tank. 
Even with small holes, the amount of hydrogen that will escape is extremely large. The 
release rate drops quickly when the pressure inside the vessel drops. For 6 mm holes, the 
initial release is about 1 kg/s; averaged over the first 5 s it is about 0.6 kg/s. It will empty 
the tank within about 10-20 s. For a 3 mm hole (a typical size for the connection from 
the tank to the regulator – even a smaller piping would do), the release starts at 0.23 kg/s. 
It is reported that many hydrogen releases are ignited (reference to HSL?) because of the 
extremely low ignition energy for hydrogen for some of its explosive range. To account 
for this, the likelihood of delayed ignition is doubled as compared to section 1.3.2. This 
is shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19 Concentration decay and mortality for the two hydrogen jet release scenarios. 
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 3 Results of consequence analysis – road 
transport of fuels 
3.1 Transport of pressurised ammonia 
The initial scenario for the transport of ammonia is conventional pressure tank trucks. 
The tank is about 46 m2 (2.2 m diameter and 12 m long), which corresponds to 24 
tonnes. The considered release scenarios in connection to road accidents with tank trucks 
are listed in Table 6. After full rupture of the tank 20 m3 (ca 15.9 tonnes) is retained in a 
pool growing to 4000 m, in about 25 s. The evaporation mass rate is about: 300 kg/s. 
 
Table 6 Accident scenarios for ammonia transport by conventional road tanker. 
 
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
Rupture of the tank 8.3 tonnes 
released 
instantaneous in 
the atmosphere, 
subsequent pool 
evaporation 200 
kg/s  over first 
60 s (total 15.7 
tonnes)  
instantaneous, 
subsequent pool 
evaporation over 
110 s 
470 m 
Release through a large, 75 mm hole 45 kg/s 500 s  640 m 
Release through a 5 mm puncture 0.22 kg/s >1200 s 
(emergency 
response 
expected) 
50 m 
In case of instantaneous release, the dispersion of the instantaneously released air-borne 
ammonia causes the longest consequence distances, see Figure 20. The pool evaporation 
is a relatively slow process (because of the high value of the heat of evaporation, the 
amount of initially airborne ammonia is low, as well as the evaporation rate, as compared 
to e.g. propane). 
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Figure 20 Concentration and fatality in case of instantaneous rupture of a 45-m3 
ammonia tank car 
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In order to reduce the consequence distances, the single tank can be portioned into 4 
smaller tanks (of about 11.3 m3 each). In that case, the consequences of the instantaneous 
cloud drop to about 200 m, see Figure 21. 
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Figure 21 Concentration and fatality in case of instantaneous rupture of a 11-m3 
ammonia tank on a multiple-tank  truck. 
But in absolute terms a release through a 75 mm hole causes larger consequence 
distances. Of course, this is an idealised down wind jet release, and apparently the 
mixing with air is slower than in case of an instantaneous rupture with all the initial, 
violent expansion phenomena. A reduction of the tank size does not alter the release and 
its atmospheric dispersion, but it does alter the duration of the jet and the cloud, which 
herewith changes the distance to fatal injury, see Figure 22.  
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Figure 22 Concentration and fatality in case of a large hole (75 mm) in an ammonia 
tank car, wind speed 2 m/s. As the release duration for a small tank is shorter, the toxic 
exposure is less and the fatality rate drops accordingly. 
The small release through a 5 mm hole in a pressurised tank shows a concentration 
profile very similar to the profile shown in Figure 4. 
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 3.2 Transport of refrigerated ammonia 
Instead of transporting ammonia in pressure-liquefied form, it is also possible to 
transport it in cryogenic or refrigerated-liquefied form at ambient pressure. This has the 
advantage, that in case of a loss of containment, there is no sudden flashing of the 
pressurised vapour, and outflow through is only driven by hydrostatic pressure. 
In case of ammonia, it means that releases result in boiling pools on the ground. The 
ammonia from boiling pools is lighter than air, and these plumes will rise. This is 
demonstrated in the three plume cross sections in Figure 24, which show the dispersion 
of ammonia from the pool which occurs after a complete rupture of one of the four 11-
m3 tanks of the truck. The highest concentrations occur with high wind speeds of ca. 10 
m/s (wind speeds over 6 m/s typically occur in 30% of the time in Western European 
coastal areas, and lesser in in-land areas).  
A comparison of the consequences of dispersion from an instantaneous boiling pool 
(evaporation rate ca. 125 kg/s over ca 1 min, see Figure 24) and evaporation from a the 
pool following outflow through a large hole (75 mm) (22 kg/s over ca 5 mins.), shows, 
that the consequence distances are largest in the latter case, both because the total 
buoyancy flux is lower (less plume rise) and the exposure duration is longer, see Figure 
23. 
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Figure 23 Concentration (at ground level) and fatality following outflow of refrigerated 
ammonia from a 75 mm hole in a 11-m3 tank 
The release scenarios for the refrigerated transport are listed in Table 7. 
Table 7 Accident scenarios for ammonia transport by a refrigerated road tanker with 4 
11-m3 tanks 
 
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
Rupture of the tank Evaporation rate 
125 kg/s  
Pool evaporation 
over 60 s 
133 m 
Release through a large, 75 mm hole 22 kg/s 310 s  208 m 
Release through a 5 mm puncture 0.1 kg/s >1200 s 
(emergency 
response 
expected) 
17 m 
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Figure 24 Plume rise of refrigerated ammonia evaporating from a boiling pool at wind 
speeds of 2, 5, and 10 m/s, respectively. 
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 3.3 Transport of LPG 
The scenario for the transport of LPG is based on the use of conventional pressure tank 
trucks (as for ammonia). The tank is about 45 m2 (2.2 m diameter and 12 m long), which 
corresponds to 18.5 tonnes. Release scenarios in connection to road accidents with tank 
trucks are listed in Table 8. 
Table 8 Accident scenarios for LPG transport by conventional road tanker. 
 
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
BLEVE 18.5 tonnes Instantaneous 167 m 
Rupture of the tank 12.6 tonnes 
released 
instantaneous in 
the atmosphere, 
subsequent pool 
evaporation 300 
kg/s (5.8 tonnes) 
Instantaneous 
with subsequent 
pool evaporation 
over 20 s 
650 m (½LFL) 
(400 m to LFL) 
VCE following rupture 2 tonnes 
involved in 
strongest blast 
 70 m around 
ignition point 
(i.e. less than 
flash fire) 
Release through a large, 75 mm hole  42kg/s 460 s 422 
VCE following 75 mm hole 1.3 tonnes 
involved in 
strongest blast 
 60 m around 
ignition point 
(i.e. less than 
flash fire) 
Release through a 5 mm puncture 0.2 kg/s >1200 s 
(emergency 
response 
expected) 
 
After a full rupture of a tank, 10 m3 (ca 5.8 tonnes) is retained in a pool growing to 1000 
m2, in about 20 s, which equals the time of evaporation. The evaporation mass rate is 
about 300 kg/s. This can be considered as an almost instantaneous release at some 
distance (a continuous release model would predict even larger consequence distances). 
The pool evaporation causes the largest consequence distances (as the violent processes 
with the rupture dilute the initial air-borne gas), see Figure 25.  
Risø-R-1504(EN) Annex E  29 
1000
10000
100000
1000000
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Distance (m)
C
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
(p
pm
)
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Fa
ta
lit
y
Conc. 2 m/s Conc. 5 m/s
Fatality 2 m/s Fatality 5 m/s
 
Figure 25 Concentration and probability of fatality due to flash fire in case of 
instantaneous rupture of an LPG tank car – dispersion from the pool using the 
instantaneous SLAM model. 
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Figure 26 Concentration and fatality in case of a large hole (75 mm) in an LPG tank 
car, wind speed 2 m/s. 
Figure 26 shows the concentration profile for an LPG release through a large hole. 
3.4 Transport of gasoline 
For the transport of gasoline, traditional thin-walled road tankers are used. The possible 
accident scenarios are listed in Table 9. According to (TNO, 1983), the possibility of a 
BLEVE of a gasoline road tanker depends on the tank material (steel or aluminium). We 
have included the BLEVE scenario, assuming rupture of the tank at 200°C after fire 
impact, where the likelihood of sufficiently long fire impact is included in the fault 
tree/BBN according to (Brockhof, 1992). 
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 Table 9 Accident scenarios for gasoline transport by thin-walled road tanker. 
 
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
BLEVE 30 tonnes Instantaneous 150 m 
Rupture of the tank Pool evaporation 
38 kg/s at 2 m/s 
wind speed (30 
tonnes) 
Pool evaporation 
over ca. 15 min. 
290 m (½LFL) 
(180 m to LFL) 
VCE following rupture 1.5 tonnes 
involved in 
strongest blast 
 65 m around 
ignition point 
(i.e. less than 
flash fire) 
Release through a large, 75 mm hole  19 kg/s, a pool 
of 30 m diameter 
forms 
Ca. 30 min. 160 m (½LFL) 
(100 m to LFL) 
VCE following 75 mm hole 0.7 tonnes 
involved in 
strongest blast 
 50 m around 
ignition point 
(i.e. less than 
flash fire) 
Pool fire following large hole 19 kg/s Ca. 30 min 20 m 
Release through a 5 mm puncture 0.09 kg/s >1200 s 
(emergency 
response 
expected) 
7 m 
Under the assumptions made for Vapour Cloud Explosions (only one third of the 
flammable cloud contents involved, ignition at two thirds of the distance to LFL), fatal 
impact of the VCE-s does not extend the flash fire distances. Figure 27 shows the 
concentration distribution following the evaporation of gasoline from the ground pool 
after rupture or a large hole (75 mm) in the tank. 
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Figure 27 Concentration of gasoline vapour and likelihood of fatality due to flash fire or 
Vapour Cloud Explosion in case of a full rupture or a large hole in a thin-walled 
gasoline road tanker, at 2 m/s wind speed. 
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3.5 Transport of Methanol 
The scenarios for methanol are similar to those for gasoline, but because of the lower 
flammability and vapour pressure, the consequence distances for each of the scenarios 
are less than for gasoline, cf. the assessment for the vehicle accident cases, see section 
2.4. 
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 4 Results of consequence analysis – Refuelling 
stations 
4.1 Ammonia 
The accident scenarios for ammonia at the refuelling station are very similar to the 
scenarios for road transport, as the road tanker and its unloading are among the major 
sources of risk. Leakage is defined as a small, 5 mm diameter hole. 
The other major source of risk is leakage or rupture of the delivery system from the 
refuelling station to the cars. Leakage is again a 5 mm diameter hole. Results of 
consequence analysis are presented in Table 10. One should note, that distances are 
related to distance from the release point. Release can take place either from the road 
tanker unloading facility, or from the delivery area – this can be rather different 
positions, as it is recommended to provide a spatial separation in order too avoid that fire 
from other fuels at the delivery area don’t affect the ammonia unloading facility. 
It is assumed in the calculation that the liquid pool following the road tank rupture can 
spread at liberty (as for the road transport case), though it is recommended to provide a 
catchment area below or around the unloading facility. 
Finally, there is a probability that the storage tank will fail. As the storage tank is 
continuously present, this causes a considerable contribution to the risk, and is calculated 
separately (see Figure 28). It is assumed that the tank is placed in a concrete underground 
pit, which will retain most of the liquid mass that will not evaporate instantaneously to a 
pool of about 100 m2. Evaporation from such a small pool will last for more than 30 
mins. at an evaporation rate of 1 kg/s over this period. Average evaporation over the first 
30 seconds will be about 7 kg/s. This will not contribute to an increase in the safety 
distance. 
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Table 10 Accident scenarios for ammonia refuelling station. 
 
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
Rupture of underground storage tank total 50 tonnes,  
16 released 
instantaneously 
in the 
atmosphere, 
remaining mass 
evaporates from  
restricted pool  
Instantaneous, 
followed by 
slow evaporation 
(less than 10 
kg/s) over more 
than 30 min.  
400 m 
Rupture of the road tanker tank 8.3 tonnes 
released 
instantaneous in 
the atmosphere, 
subsequent pool 
evaporation 200 
kg/s  over first 
60 s (total 15.7 
tonnes)  
Instantaneous, 
subsequent pool 
evaporation over 
110 s 
470 m 
(Identical to road 
transport 
scenario) 
Release through a large, 50 mm hole 
(rupture of the unloading arm or hose 
between the road tanker and the 
refuelling station) 
10 kg/s >1200 s 
(emergency 
response 
expected) 
373 m 
Release through a 13 mm diameter 
hole (rupture of the delivery hose 
from the refuelling station to the car) 
1 kg/s >1200 s 
(emergency 
response 
expected) 
114 m 
Release through a 5 mm puncture 
(leak of pipe or hose) 
0.22 kg/s >1200 s 
(emergency 
response 
expected) 
50 m 
(Identical to road 
transport 
scenario) 
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Figure 28 Concentration and fatality following a catastrophic failure of the ammonia 
storage tank (50 tonnes capacity) - contribution from the instantaneously released 
airborne cloud. 
 
4.2 LPG 
The accident scenarios for the refuelling station are very similar to those for the road 
transport, see the remarks for ammonia. Results are presented in Table 11. Note that the 
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 BLEVE can be caused (will most often be caused) by ignited releases from leaks and 
ruptures of the pipes and hoses. 
Also here there is the additional possibility of the failure of the storage tank. As the tank 
is underground, we don’t assume the possibility of a fireball (as the tank cannot be 
subject to fire impingement), only vapour cloud dispersion with subsequent delayed 
ignition. The storage tank is assumed to be 100 m3, equal to the ammonia storage tank, 
though the mass capacity is slightly less (41 tonnes in stead of 50 tonnes). As in the case 
of ammonia, we expect the pool spreading of the LPG that does not become directly 
airborne to be restricted to a tank pit area of about 100 m2.  Even if the total amount 
release is larger than in case of the tank car failure, the distance is smaller, as in the tank 
car case, the long distance originates from the cloud generated from the rapidly 
evaporating pool (pool surface 1000 m2). 
Table 11 Accident scenarios for LPG refuelling station. 
 
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
BLEVE of tank car 18.5 tonnes Instantaneous 167 m 
Rupture of the tank car 12.6 tonnes 
released 
instantaneously, 
subsequent pool 
evaporation 300 
kg/s (5.8 tonnes) 
Instantaneous 
with subsequent 
pool evaporation 
over 20 s 
650 m (½LFL) 
(400 m to LFL) 
(Identical to road 
transport 
scenario) 
Rupture of underground storage tank 28 tonnes 
released 
instantaneously 
Instantaneous 
with subsequent 
slow evaporation 
(less than 20 
kg/s) over more 
than 30 min. 
525 m (½LFL) 
(250 m to LFL) 
Release through a large, 50 mm hole 
(rupture of the unloading arm or hose 
between the road tanker and the 
refuelling station) 
 11 kg/s >1200 s 
(emergency 
response 
expected) 
184 m 
Release through a 13 mm diameter 
hole (rupture of the delivery hose 
from the refuelling station to the car) 
1 kg/s >1200 s 
(emergency 
response 
expected) 
40 m 
Release through a 5 mm puncture 
(leak of pipe or hose) 
0.2 kg/s >1200 s 
(emergency 
response 
expected) 
5 m 
(Identical to road 
transport 
scenario) 
4.3 Gasoline 
The accident scenarios for the refuelling station are very similar to those for the road 
transport, see the remarks for ammonia. Results are presented in Table 12. Note that the 
BLEVE can be caused (will most often be caused) by ignited releases from leaks and 
ruptures of the pipes and hoses. The release following rupture of pipes and hoses is based 
on the assumption that the transfer pumps are still running. Therefore the release rate for 
a 50 mm line is larger than the release from a 75 mm hole in a tank (see chapter on road 
transport), which is driven by hydrostatic pressure only. 
 
Risø-R-1504(EN) Annex E  35 
Table 12 Accident scenarios for gasoline refuelling. 
 
Scenario Release rate Release 
duration 
10% fatality 
distance 
BLEVE 30 tonnes Instantaneous 150 m 
Rupture of the tank Pool evaporation 
38 kg/s at 2 m/s 
wind speed (30 
tonnes) 
Pool evaporation 
over ca. 15 min. 
290 m (½LFL) 
(180 m to LFL) 
(Identical to road 
transport 
scenario) 
VCE following rupture 1.5 tonnes 
involved in 
strongest blast 
 65 m around 
ignition point 
(i.e. less than 
flash fire) 
Release through a large, 50 mm hole 
(rupture of the unloading arm or hose 
between the road tanker and the 
refuelling station) 
 25 kg/s, a pool 
of 34 m diameter 
forms 
Ca. 30 min. 201 m (½LFL) 
(100 m to LFL) 
Pool fire following large hole 25 kg/s Ca. 30 min 35 m 
Release through a 13 mm diameter 
hole (rupture of the delivery hose 
from the refuelling station to the car) 
1 kg/s , a pool of 
7 m diameter 
forms 
Ca. 30 min 25 m (½LFL) 
(20 m to LFL) 
Release through a 5 mm puncture 
(leak in pipe or hose) 
0.09 kg/s >1200 s 
(emergency 
response 
expected) 
7 m 
(Identical to road 
transport 
scenario) 
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1 FMEA and HAZOP analysis of the car system 
To secure a safe system in the car, two studies for identifying potential hazards have 
been carried out using the primarily design of the system. The two methods used are a 
FMEA and a HAZOP study. The hazards in focus are releases of ammonia. 
The main purpose of the analysis is to decide a sufficient safety system that prevents 
unnecessary releases during filling and driving. 
The FMEA analysis identified some need for safety systems, which are illustrated on 
Figure 1. This concerns primarily the tank system. 
Tank
Check
valve
Floater
Magnetic valve
Pressure regulator
(never fully closed)
Float
valve
Connector to
filling hose
Level indicator
Ammonia vehicle tank
P
Heating
(Excess heat from
Fuel Cell)
PLC
On high level,
open  magn. valve
Turn on/off
Valve open only on
proper connect ion
Excess flow
stop valve
On low pressure
close Magn. valve
Power control
(?)
Vaporizer
To reformer
Multivalve components
P
On low pressure
close Magn. valve
Bursting
disc
 
 
Figure 1 Safety systems around the ammonia tank 
 
The main results from the FMEA analysis: 
• To secure that the connection system in the filling line are empty both before 
filling and after a filling a vacuum check has to be carried out to prevent a 
release of ammonia. 
• A pressure relief system has to be installed on the tank to prevent the tank 
from overpressure in case of overfilling. 
• An external frame to prevent the tank from damage in a collision is proposed 
• In case the external detector detects ammonia the current to magnetic valve 
should be cut-off. 
• Furthermore was identified need for ammonia detectors both inside the 
system and outside the system. Inside to prevent unreformed ammonia to get 
into the fuel cells and outside to detect external releases of ammonia 
Next pages show the schemes from the FMEA analysis of the car system 
 
Failure Mode and effect 
analysis (FMEA) 
 
   
    
     
 
Component Failure mode Cause Effects and Detection Measures 
Safety System 1, Safe 
connection to filling station and 
depressurisation of filling line 
Fails open mechanical, obstruction, wrong 
operation 
loss of vacuum during normal 
operation, air/humidity in 
system at next fill. Then Safety 
Systems 2 and 3 are barriers 
between tank and environment
Check of vacuum before filling 
at filling station 
Safety System 1, Safe 
connection to filling station and 
depressurisation of filling line 
Fails closed mechanical, obstruction, wrong 
operation 
Filling not possible   
Filling hose leakage mechanical impact, Fatigue 
(pressure cycles) 
Release of liquid ammonia 
during filling 
Ammonia detection at filling 
station, inspection 
Filling hose leakage   loss of vacuum during normal 
operation, air/humidity in 
system at next fill 
Check of vacuum before filling 
at filling station 
Safety System 2, Stop filling at 
maximum fill level 
Fails in open position malfunction, mechanical, 
leakage (seals) 
overfilling of tank during filling Pressure relief system.(Safety 
System 4) 
Safety System 2, Stop filling at 
maximum fill level 
Fails in closed position malfunction, mechanical Filling not possible   
Safety System 3, avoid 
backflow from tank to filling line 
Fails in open position mechanical Filling hose remains at 
pressure and filled with 
ammonis, possibly tank 
emptied during emptying of 
filling hose, underpressure 
(vacuum) and collapse of 
empty tank 
test of vacuum at filling hose at 
filling station before/after filling. 
Safety System 3, avoid 
backflow from tank to filling line 
Fails in closed position mechanical Filling not possible   
Tank Small Leakage mechanical impact, Seals release of ammonia, detection 
through smell or drop in level 
inspection, ammonia detector 
Tank Major Leak mechanical impact, fire, 
overfilling 
Major release of liquid 
ammonia, fatal injury 
external frame to protect tank 
on impact. Pressure relief 
system. Fire will not be a 
problem - release will be slow 
and ammonia will burn off. 
Safety System 5 Fails in open position mechanical, electrical (circuit
cannot be cut) 
 ammonia supply to regulator 
cannot be closed, likely 
leakage through regulator with 
continuous supply to reformer, 
and possible release of 
ammonia through the fuel cell 
stack, fails to reduce ammonia 
supply in case of excess flow 
(release) 
ammonia detection after the 
reformer or washer will indicate 
whether ammonia is leaking 
into the stack. The activation of 
the valve by electrical current 
can be monitored. 
Safety System 5 Fails in closed position electrical (fail-safe), 
mechanical 
No ammonia to regulator   
Tubing to regulator leakage mechanical impact liquid ammonia release Current to magnetic valve 
should be cut-off on 
mechanical impact of tubing, 
ammonia detection outside 
tank, maximum flow restrictor 
Regulator Fails open mechanical Full tank pressure on reformer, 
release of ammonia through 
fuel cell stack 
ammonia detection after 
reformer, pressure indicator 
(high pressure alarm) after 
regulator 
Regulator Fails closed mechanical No ammonia to reformer   
Evaporator Leakage ammonia side see tubing to regulator see tubing to regulator see tubing to regulator 
Evaporator Leakage between sides corrosion, wearing reaction between heat medium 
(water) and ammonia, humidity 
in ammonia, further corrsion, 
release 
maintenance, inspection, 
check of abnormal temperature 
behaviour (heat release - 
especially when not operating) 
Tubing to reformer Leakage mechanical impact release of ammonia vapour 
(moderate pressure) 
Current to magnetic valve 
should be cut-off on 
mechanical impact of tubing, 
ammonia detection outside 
tubing 
Reformer Leakage ammonia side mechanical impact, corrosion   release of ammonia vapour 
(moderate pressure) 
Heating on outside will 
diminish likelihood of 
uninterupted ammonia release 
Reformer Leakage between sides corrosion, wearing, 
temperature cycles, 
mechanical impact 
Ammonia will possibly be 
burned off 
  
Reformer not functioning No heat, Catalyst poisoned Ammonia will pass through to 
washer and fuel cell stack 
ammonia detection after 
reformer 
Safety System 4 Fails Closed mechanical Pressure build-up cannot be 
prevented, rupture of tank 
this system is back-up for 
overfilling prevention 
Safety System 4 Fails open mechanical Constant flow of ammonia to 
reformer cannot be aborted 
A venting event need to cause 
an alarm (logged) 
 
2 Hazop analysis of the car system 
The HAZOP analysis was then carried out to supplement the FMEA analysis, as the FMEA analysis takes its 
starting point in a failure mode of a component and look at the resulting consequences on the system, while the 
HAZOP analysis takes the starting point in a deviation of the process parameters, the consequences of this 
deviation and then the cause for this deviation is assessed. The subdivision of the system for the HAZOP study is 
shown in Figure 2. 
The main results from the HAZOP analysis are that the proposed safety systems will prevent the potential events 
found during the HAZOP study. The results are seen in the following scheme.  
System Event Safeguard Conclusion 
Fill line to 
tank 
Release due to check 
valve on tank fails and 
valve at connection fails 
as well on disconnection. 
Release by filling 
Disconnection safety system on car. 
Line empty 
 
Concentration based alarm, 
emergency shut down of fuelling 
station 
The safety system 
prevents a release of 
ammonia 
Tank Release  Safe design of the tank. The tank is 
designed to withstand a collision. 
External frame to protect tank on 
impact. 
In case of fire the lining will melt 
and cause only slow release. 
A level indicator protects overfilling 
and valves close at max. level. 
Gas alarm is installed 
Safety system on compressor and 
vacuum compressor to prevent 
damage on tank 
Max. flow valve in pipe from tank. 
The safeguard will 
prevent damage of the 
tank and a total release 
will only happen in very 
severe accidents. 
Small punctures with a 
leak will be detected by 
the gas alarm. This will 
also detect gas leakages 
from other parts of the 
ammonia system. The 
max flow valve in pipe 
fron tank and narrow 
pipes decrease a leak 
from this system. 
Evaporator Down-flow section on 
high pressure due to 
evaporator failure. Down 
flow system not designed 
for high pressure. Fuel 
cells will be destroyed 
and leaks can occur 
High-pressure alarm on down flow 
section closes main valve. 
Gas alarm installed 
The safety system will 
protect the down flow 
system and the fuel cells. 
 
Reformers Overheating 
 
 
Temperature control on burner 
Temperature control on El. reformer 
 
Burners 
and burner 
flue gas 
Release of burner fuel 
through the compressor 
Check valve on compressor This can happen in case 
the burner outlet is 
blocked. 
Absorbers Poisoned absorbers will 
allow NH3  into the fuel 
cells and damage these 
 
NH3 sensor ?  
Fuel cells  
 
 
 Leakages from the system 
are limited and will be 
detected by the gas alarm 
Table 1 Results of the HAZOP study of the car system 
2.1 Guide words
Guide Word         More than     
  No Low High Part of Also Other than Reverse 
Process Variable               
Flow No Flow Low Flow High Flow Missing Ingredients Impurities 
Wrong 
Substance Reverse Flow
Level Empty Low Level High Level Low Interface High Interface - - 
Pressure Open to atmosphere Low Pressure High Pressure - - - Vacuum 
Temperature     Freezing Low Temperature
High 
Temperature - - -
Auto 
Refrigeration
Agitation No Agitation Poor Mixing Excessive Mixing 
Irregular 
Mixing Foaming  -
Phase 
Separation 
Reaction No Reaction Slow Reaction Runaway Reaction 
Partial 
Reaction Side Reaction
Wrong 
Reaction 
Decompo-
sition 
Other Utility Failure External Leak External Rupture     
Start up/      
Shut down/ 
Maintenance
  
Car system 
 
 
 
 
Tank
Ammonia car system
Heating
(Excess heat
from
Fuel Cell)
Vaporizer
El. reformer
Multivalve
components
 
 
reformer
Absorber B Recuperative
Absorbers A
H2inH2out
Cooling water
Air in
Flue gas
Air
PEM Fuel cell
 
igure 2 Car system with subdivision for the HAZOP study F
 
 

Operational Phase: filling     
     
  
  
  
    
 
Plant: Car Design/operating pressure 15 bar  
Plant section filling line to tank  Design/operating temperature ambient
Hazop Group: 
 
jepa,fram,nidu
 
Date 21-11-2003  
Guide word Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions 
No No flow tank station compressor fails tank can't be filled     
    valves not open, connection 
not assured 
tank can't be filled     
    max level reached OK     
    line blocked, impurities in 
system 
tank can't be filled     
    pressure in tank too high, 
control system failed 
overfilled, see tank safety system no…   
low Low flow leak, leaking connection release     
    tank station compressor fails tank fills slowly     
    valves not completely open tank fills slowly     
    line partly blocked tank fills slowly     
High high flow tank station compressor 
pressure too high 
larger risk for overfilling and valve 
damage 
    
Also impurities low grade in station tank,  blocking in system, corrosion, 
undesired reactions 
    
    damage in tank filling system blocking and damage of system     
Other than wrong substance wrong substance in filling 
station tank, wrong delivery 
undesired reactions in system, 
damage to system, corrosion 
connections are substance 
specific 
  
    station tank empty and other 
gases in vapour space, 
failure of control system 
undesired reactions in system, 
damage to system, corrosion 
    
Reverse reverseflow non return valve (check 
valve) on tank fails wile 
depressurising filling line 
tank empties while lines are 
connected, possibly to vacuum 
(tank collapse). Filling line 
remains pressurised, possible 
outflow when valve and safety 
system on disconnection fails as 
well. 
disconnection safety system 
on car and station side 
  
    check valve fails and valve 
at connection fails as well on 
disconnection 
release disconnection safety system 
on car 
  
No no pressure, se no flow         
Low low pressure No flow? Evaporation. 2-
phase 
      
High high pressure Too high pressure from 
compressor 
rupture of line and/tank and 
release 
safety system on 
compressor 
  
Reverse  vacuum Vacuum compressor sucking
pressure lower than design 
of filling line 
 line collapse safety system on  vacuum 
compressor 
  
Also-Phase two phase flow High temperature (vapour 
pressure > compressor 
pressure 
limited    ?
Other than-Phase gas phase same limited   ? 
    not compressible gas, wrong 
substance, station tank 
empty 
undesired reactions in system, 
damage to system, corrosion 
    
No-Other Failure of utilities no power, no compressor 
pressure 
no filling     
    utility failure while filling unable to depressurise and 
disconnect 
    
    car el system fails el-based alarm and safety 
systems don’t work 
overfilling safeguard partly 
mechanic (redundancy), 
  
        fail-safe systems (valve 
close on power failure) 
  
Low-Other Minor release Damage to line release while filling, unable to 
depressurise below ambient 
pressure 
concentration based alarm, 
emergency shut down of 
filling station 
  
High-Other  Rupture Damage to line Release while filling concentration based alarm, 
emergency shut down of 
filling station 
  
 
Operational Phase: All phases     
      
  
    
  
    
Plant: Design/operating pressure 15 bar  
Plant section tank Design/operating temperature ambient
Hazop Group: 
 
jepa,fram,nidu
 
Date 21-11-2003  
Guide word Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions 
Pressure           
no Atmospheric pressure Rupture Release of NH3     
   Valves open Release of NH3     
low low pressure emty tank Problems upstream if P< Pmin     
   rupture Release of NH3     
    low temperature no flow to system - no hazard     
high high pressure overfilled & temperature rise rupture if P>Pmax max. level close valve, relief 
valve 
  
    Deformation of tank- collision rupture if P>Pmax Safe design   
    fire rupture if P>Pmax Safe design (lining melts, 
slow release) 
  
reverse vacuum Valves open while vacuum 
compressor on. 
Implosion of the tank Compressor runs only for 
limited time (don't empty 
tank) 
  
Temperature      Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no freezing outside temp. below xx gr. C? no pressure     
            
low low temperature outside temp. Low no pressure     
   Evaporation from tank due to 
a leak  
      
            
high high temperature outside temp.high        
    Fire rupture if P>Pmax Safe design (lining melts, 
slow release) 
  
reverse Auto refrigeration         
            
Level      Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
No Empty Leak   level  indicator   
    Tank empty       
Low Low level Leak   level  indicator   
    Tank empty       
High High level Overfilled   Valves close at max.level   
            
            
            
            
Flow      Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no no flow Pipe from tank blocked, valve 
fails closed 
system doesn't  work     
   Lack of sufficient pressure       
low low flow Pipe from tank blocked, valve 
fails not fully opened 
system doesn't  work     
    Lack of sufficient pressure       
high high flow Leak in pipe from tank   Max flow valve, design: 
piping from tank is narrow 
  
part of           
more than   See filling line       
Other than wrong substance See filling line       
            
Reverse  reverseflow See filling line       
            
Other      Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
Other low External leak puncture (car accident) release, toxic impact and ignition gas alarm location of gas sensor is 
critical 
    leak (material degradation, 
maintenance, vibration) 
release, toxic impact and ignition gas alarm   
Other-high External rupture rupture (car accident) large release design, structural intergity, 
location in the car, protection
  
 
 
Operational Phase:      
     
  
  
  
    
 
Plant: Car Design/operating pressure 15 bar  
Plant section Line from tank+evaporator  Design/operating temperature ambient
Hazop Group: 
 
jepa,fram, nidu 
 
 Date 23.2.2004
Guide word Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions 
Pressure           
no Atmospheric pressure see tank       
low  Low pressure see tank       
    leakage between sides ammonia into heat medium, 
corrosion in cooling system 
ammonia sensor in 
cooling water? 
  
            
High High pressure see tank leakage evaporator will relief 
pressure to down-
flow section, valves 
in down-flow section 
should always allow 
for a mass flow 
through absorbers 
  
            
Temperature      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
low low temperature heating insufficient -> 
sufficient evaporation is not 
possible 
liquid ammonia in system after 
vaporiser 
  Evaporator closes on two-
phase flow, Problems 
because of water contents 
in ammonia? 
high high temperature fire high pressure in line see high pressure   
            
Flow      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no no flow power control stucked no flow to system     
    Valve closed       
    Evaporator defect       
          
low low flow Valve partly open       
    power control defect       
    Evaporator defect       
    heating insufficient -> 
evaporation insufficient 
see low temperature     
High high flow leak, evaporator fails open down-flow section becomes 
pressurised, fuel cell may be 
destroyed 
High pressure alarm 
on down flow section 
closed main valve 
  
Also impurities see filling-line or 
corrosion/degradation in 
tank system causing 
impurities 
block line, low flow     
reverse reverse flow Down flow section pressure 
higher than tank pressure & 
blockage 
H2 in tank Evaporator acts as 
non-return valve 
improbable 
            
Phase      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
More than 2 phases Evaporator problems 
Heating insufficient 
see low temperature     
Other than Wrong phase No heating see low temperature     
    Heating medium in ammonia 
system?, leak between sides
steam in down-flow section 
(problem?); loss of cooling water, 
see leak between sides 
  Depends on cooling water 
pressure 
        
            
Other      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
Other than Shut down main valve fails open Cannot close system     
  Start up main valve fails closed Cannot start system     
 
 
 
 
Operational Phase: running/all phases 
 
    
     
  
  
  
    
Plant: Car Design/operating pressure 2.5 bar abs  
Plant section Line to reformers  Design/operating temperature ambient
Hazop Group: 
 
jepa, fram, nidu 
 
 Date 23.2.04
Guide word Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions 
pressure           
no Atmospheric pressure rupture   flow is restricted by 
small pipe on tank; gas 
detecr/gas alarm 
position of gas 
sensors is 
critical 
low Low pressure Evaporator problems       
High High pressure Evaporator defect down-flow section becomes 
pressurised 
design pressure above 
maximum tank 
pressure 
  
            
Temperature      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
low low temperature Insufficient heating to 
evaporator 
      
high high temperature fire Rupture/leakage of line valves in down-flow 
section should always 
allow for a mass flow 
through absorbers 
  
    Overheating by heat 
exchangers 
Rupture/leakage of line Problem caused by 
faults in regulation of 
reformer 
X 
            
Flow      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no no flow evaporator problems no flow to reformers     
    valves stucked       
    pipe rupture       
    power control system defect       
low low flow evaporator problems   control system checks 
flow measurements  
and power output with 
valve settings and 
operation envelopes 
optional? 
    Valves not sufficiently open       
    leak   gas alarm   
    power control system defect       
High high flow power control system defect H2 is not used in PEM   diagnostics in 
control 
system? 
            
reverse   reverse flow see evaporator       
            
Other      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
            
Low External leak Leak in heat exchanger ammonia bypasses reformer, too 
high ammonia level before 
absorbers 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Operational Phase:      
  
   
Plant: Car Design/operating 
pressure 
2.5 bar  
Plant section Reformers and output  Design/operating 
temperature 
~800 deg.C  
Hazop Group: 
 
jepa, nidu  Date 25.feb. 2004 
 
Rev. 6.Okt.2004 
 
 
Guide word Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions 
Pressure           
            
no Atmospheric pressure   No flow     
           
low low pressure leak in pipes NH3 to environment     
    Leakages between sides se above     
            
high high pressure blockage/ pressure reg. 
Defect 
No flow     
    Pressure reg. Failure Down flow pressurised Down flow valves should always 
dep. The system.or design pressure 
of down flow system above max. 
Tank pressure. Protection of the 
pressure sensitive components. 
  
Temperature      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
low low temperature burner insufficient due to air 
problems 
No reforming, NH3 to 
down flow section 
    
    burner insufficient due H2 
problems 
No reforming, NH3 to 
down flow section 
    
    catalyst on burner side 
poisened 
No reforming, NH3 to 
down flow section 
    
high high temperature Low flow Material failure     
    Exotherm reaction due to air 
ingress in system. 
Material failure Minimum liquid level in tank   
            
            
            
Flow      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no     no flow blockage Overheating Temperature control on burner   
    Valves closed Overheating     
    Leak Overheating     
low low flow partly blocked 
leak 
Overheating     
high high flow Pressure reg. Failure reformer overload->NH3 small pipes   
            
Reaction      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
            
no no reaction  temp. too low NH3 into down flow 
section 
    
low slow reaction  catalyst poisened       
part of partial reaction  catalyst poisened NH3 into down flow 
section 
    
Other than Exotherm reaction Air ingress in system Material damage due to 
high temperature 
Minimum liquid level in tank   
            
      
Other      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
      
low external leak collision, corrosion, NH3 to environment     
  Internal leak Internal rupture-start 
reformer 
NH3 to sec. side and 
burning 
    
    Internal rupture end reformer H2 to sec. side and 
burning 
    
high external rupture collision NH3 to environment     
other than start up/shut down/ 
maintenance 
lack of el.power to el. 
reformer 
no start of reformer     
    valve do not close no stop of reformer     
            
      
Note: The only way of creating 
underpressure in the 
system is by a vacuum 
condition in the tank when 
empty for liquid. Another 
potential source of 
underpressure could be an 
ejector effect of the air 
compressor to the burner 
on the feed flow to the 
burner. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operational Phase:      
  
    
Plant: Car  Design/operating pressure 2.5 bar  
Plant section Burner and burner flue gas  Design/operating 
temperature 
~800 deg.C  
Hazop Group: 
 
jepa, nidu  Date 26.feb. 2004 
 
6.oct.2004
Guide word Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions 
Pressure           
            
no Atmospheric pressure   No burning - no heat     
low low pressure   Insufficient burning     
high high pressure outlet blocked Reverse flow in air 
compressor and release of 
burner fuel. 
Non return valve 
on compressor 
  
Temperature      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
low low temperature burner insufficient due to air 
problems 
No reforming, NH3 to down 
flow section 
    
    burner insufficient due H2 problems No reforming, NH3 to down 
flow section 
    
    catalyst on burner side poisened No reforming, NH3 to down 
flow section 
    
high high temperature Low flow       
    Failure in flow control to burner ( 
High flow to burner) 
Overheating  Temperature
measurements of 
flue gas 
  
Flow     Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no no flow valve closed 
pipe rupture 
blockage 
temperature low- no 
reforming 
    
low low flow partly blocked 
leak 
temperature low- no 
reforming 
    
      unstable burner behaviour?   Depends on fuel 
behaviour and catalyst 
ignition. 
high high flow Failure in flow control to burner ( 
High flow to burner) 
Overheating  Temperature
measurements of 
flue gas 
  
            
      
      
      
Reaction     Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no     no reaction problems with:
catalyst 
air 
H2 
no cracking of NH3     
low     slow reaction problems with:
catalyst 
air 
H2 
insufficient cracking     
high run away reaction, sec excess H2 + air Over heating     
part of partial reaction catalyst poisened temp.too low-no reforming     
also side reaction NH3 in reaction       
other than wrong reaction, sec. excess H2 + air 
NH3 in reaction 
or ? 
explosion     
      
Other     Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no Air compressor failure Mech. or el. failure Incomplete combustion on 
burner side 
Close burner if no 
air pressure 
  
low external leak collision, corrosion, Release of H2 and NH3 NH3 sensor in 
ventilation system 
to passengers 
cabin? 
Strategy concerning 
NH3 sensors and 
their position. 
high    external rupture collision Release of H2 and NH3 NH3 sensor in 
ventilation system 
to passengers 
cabin? 
  
other than start up/shut down/ maintenance lack of el.power to el. reformer no start of reformer     
    valve do not close no stop of reformer     
    Valve failures no start of reformer     
 
 
Operational Phase: Start up      
  Plant: Car Design/operating pressure 2.5 bar  
Plant section El. reformer  Design/operating temperature ~800 deg.C  
Hazop Group: jepa, nidu  Date 25.02.2004 Rev. 6.oct. 2004  
Guide word Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions 
Pressure           
no Atmospheric pressure   no flow     
low Low pressure         
High High pressure Valves closed while heating
blokage down stream 
Rupture of reformer Design pressure higher than 
max. Tank pressure. 
  
    Pressure regulator failed high flow     
Temperature      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
low low temperature insufficient power Start up failed     
high high temperature power control defect Material failure Independent temperature 
control 
  
Flow      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no no flow blockage Start up failure     
low low flow partly blockage slow start up     
high high flow Pressure regulator failed Incomplete conversion of NH3     
Reaction    Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no no reaction low temperature NH3 down stream     
low Slow reaction low temperature 
catalyst defect 
NH3 down stream     
high           
part of   catalyst poisened NH3 down stream     
also            
Other than Exotherm reaction Air ingress in system Material damage due to high 
temperature 
Minimum liquid level in tank   
Other      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no utility failure El. failure No reaction     
low external leak collision, corrosion, NH3 to environment     
high external rupture collision NH3 to environment     
other than start up/shut down/ 
maintenance 
lack of el.power to el. 
reformer 
no start of reformer     
 
Operational Phase:      
    
    
  
Plant: Design/operating pressure 
Plant section Absorbers Design/operating temperature 
Hazop Group: jepa, nidu  Date 01.03.2004 
Guide word Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions 
Pressure           
no           
low           
high     Material failure Design pressure 
above maximum 
tank pressure 
  
Temperature      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
low           
high           
Flow     Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no           
low           
high           
Reaction      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
            
no No reaction poisoned absorber Damage to fuel cells NH3 sensor ? x 
low slow reaction poisoned absorber Damage to fuel cells   x 
part of partial reaction NH3 overload Damage to fuel cells   x 
           
Other     Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no           
low           
high           
other than           
 
 
 
Operational Phase:      
    
  
  
Plant: Car Design/operating pressure 
Plant section PEM fuel cell  Design/operating temperature 
Hazop Group: jepa,nidu Date 01.03.2004 Rev 6.okt.2004  
Guide word Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions 
Pressure           
no           
low           
high   Pressure regulator failure Damage of cells. Leakage from 
H2 to air. Possibility for fire. 
Release of NH3 from fuel cell 
NH3 release restricted due 
to small diameter of pipe 
between tank and 
evaporizer. 
Emergency shut down valve
Unlikely to make a fuel cell 
to more than 2 bar pressure 
difference. 
Temperature      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
low           
high           
Flow      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no     No power output     
low           
high           
Reaction      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
            
no No reaction Cell defect 
wrong gas 
No power NH3 sensor ? x 
low slow reaction Cell defect 
wrong gas 
Low power   x 
part of partial reaction Cell defect 
wrong gas 
low power   x 
           
Other      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no           
low           
high           
other than           
 3 Refuelling station system  -    HAZOP Study 
 
A HAZOP analysis has been performed on the ammonia refueling station. The main problem addressed is release 
of NH3 
The HAZOP analysis was performed on the basis of the PI- diagram Fejl! Henvisningskilde ikke fundet. of the 
refueling station. The aim of the analysis was to optimize the design due to prevention of unwanted events and in 
case this is not possible how to mitigate the consequences of these events. . The amount of ammonia in the 
systems in question: 
 
Truck    25 t  
Refuelling station  50 t 
Car    0.05 t    
 
The results from the HAZOP are the following: 
1. Fill line to tank 
In case of damage of the fill line system check valves must be installed to prevent larger amount of NH3 release.  
To prevent the truck to leave the filling system with the hose still connected an interlock system is proposed to be 
installed e.g. the car key is used in the filling system. 
As the transport by truck is planned to be a pressure-less cryogenic transport at –34 oC, and the refuelling station 
tank is at ambient temperature  ~12 oC, a heating system is required in the filling line. To heat 25 t of NH3 from –
34 oC to 12 oC in half an hour require a heating system on 3 MW. The heating system is not designed yet, but the 
energy demand is ~1,1 % of the heated NH3, if NH3 is used as energy source. The amount of NH3 in the heating 
system is not known, while it depends on the system. A separate analysis must be performed on the heating 
system. A heating system on 3 MW is not a small system and must be expected to contain a certain amount of 
NH3 
 
2. Tank 
To prevent damage of the tank by collision or fire, the tank is proposed to be underground in a filled concrete pit. 
Damage of the tank can also happen by overfilling and heating. To prevent overfilling a level controller must be 
installed which close the filling line at a certain level in the tank. The worst-case scenario for overfilling is by a 
failure in the heating system with the consequence that NH3 at –34 oC is filled into the tank. Assumed that the 
maximum filling level is 80% and the amount of NH3 at this level is 50t at 12 oC. The volume of 50t of NH3 is 
80.5 m3.  This means that the total tank volume is ~100 m3. If the tank is filled 80% with NH3 at –34 oC the 
amount of NH3 at 80% level is 55t. The 55 t of NH3 will be heated to ambient temperature 12 oC and the volume 
will increase to 88.5 m3, which is ~88% of a full tank. To exceed the volume of the full tank it requires a 
temperature on 62 oC. and this is not seen as a possible event. 
Overfilling can also happen in case the level controller fails and the tank will be pressurized to the max pressure 
of the filling pump. The design of the tank must ensure that the maximum allowable pressure in the tank is above 
the maximum pressure of the pump. 
A safety valve is installed on top of the tank.  
 
 
 
3. Fill line to car 
In case of damage of this fill line, check valves must be installed to prevent larger amount of NH3 release. As for 
the truck connection an interlock must be installed to prevent the car to leave the refuelling station with the hose 
still connected. 
 
4. Vacuum system 
A vacuum system is installed to empty the hoses and prevent a release of NH3 when disconnecting the hose from 
the car. A pressure control system is installed to ensure that disconnection can only be performed at a certain low 
pressure. 
 
 

 3.1 Fuelling station system 
 
 
Car Safety System 3
Avoid backflow from
tank to filling line
Car Safety System 2
Avoid overfilling
To Car Tank
 
 
Underground tank in filled
concrete pit
 
P
Vacuum pumpLogic controller
Optional heat exchanger for
cryogenic deliveries
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1 Conclusions from the HAZOP study of the refuelling station 
 
 
System  Event Safeguards Conclusion 
Fill line to tank 
Fill line to car 
Release Check valves installed If a damage to the fill line occur only a minor release of NH3 will happen 
due to the installed check valves 
 Heating 
system. 
NOT 
TREATED 
Release Check valves between the 
tank and the heating 
system 
The heating system is not designed yet but require an effect of ~3MW, if 
the filling operation is estimated to take 0.5 hour. The possible amount of 
NH3 to release e.g. due to a collision is the content of the heating system. 
    
Tank Release due to 
collision and 
corrosion 
Tank in filled concrete 
pit. NH3 detector. Check 
valves, safety valves. 
Corrosion protection. 
To avoid collision and the consequences of a rupture of the tank and the 
connected pipes, the tank is placed underground in a filled concrete pit  
The tank must be inspected or tested regularly (Pressure tank) 
 Release due to 
rupture after 
an overfilling 
and heating of 
the tank 
The tank must be filled to 
no more than 80% of full 
volume. 
Level control. 
The restriction on the maximum filling level give place for expansion of 
50 t of NH3 at  –33 deg.C  up to ~62 deg. C 
Heated up to 12 deg. C the NH3 will expand to 88% of a full tank 
 Release due to 
fire 
Tank in filled concrete 
pit. 
When the tank is placed underground the exposure to fire is minimal. 
Vacuum line No vacuum Pressure control and ? Minor release of NH3 
Filling lines (in 
both ends) 
Forgotten to 
disconnect the 
cars before 
driving          
=> release 
Interlock system between 
car and filling system 
If an interlock is established, so that the car is not able to drive, it is 
assumed to be a safe solution. 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Operational Phase: Filling refuelling station tank     
Plant: Refuelling station  Design/operating pressure   
  
  
      
Plant section Fill line toTank  Design/operating temperature 
Hazop Group: jepa, nidu  Date  18.10.2004
Pressure Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
No Atmospheric pressure connection valve stucked in open 
position 
Release of NH3 check valve before compressor   
Low low pressure No pressure from truck       
High high pressure Too high pressure from compressor rupture of line and/tank and release safety system on compressor Design pressure obove 
compressor maximum 
pressure 
Reverse vacuum         
Also-Phase two phase flow High temperature (vapour pressure 
> compressor pressure 
    Design  
Flow      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
No No flow compressor fails tank can't be filled     
    valves not open, connection not 
assured 
tank can't be filled     
    max level reached OK     
    line blocked, impurities in system tank can't be filled     
    pressure in tank too high, control 
system failed 
  safety system no… see overfilling of tank 
low Low flow leak, leaking connection release     
    compressor fails tank fills slowly     
    valves not completely open tank fills slowly     
    line partly blocked tank fills slowly     
High high flow compressor pressure too high larger risk for overfilling and valve damage Design pressure of system above maximum 
compressor pressure 
  
Also impurities low grade in tankcar   blocking in system, corrosion, undesired 
reactions 
    
    damage in tank filling system blocking and damage of system     
Other than wrong substance wrong substance in  tankcar, worng 
delivery 
undesired reactions in system, damaget to 
system, corrosion 
connections are substance specific   
Reverse reverseflow non return valve (check valve) on 
tank stucked  
      
    check valve fails and valve at 
connection fails as well on 
disconnection 
release     
  
Temperature      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
Low   Heat exchanger doesn't work See overfilling of tank     
High   Temperature control doesn't work       
Other      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
Other than-Phase gas phase same limited     
  Gas phase in suction line Evaporation in suction line due to 
ambient heat 
compressor doesn't work Booster pump on truck   
    not condensable gas, wrong 
substance, station tank empty 
undesired reactions in system, damaget to 
system, corrosion 
    
No-Other Failure of utilities no power, no compressor pressure no filling     
    utility failure while filling       
    Lack of heating cold NH3 in tank and danger of overfilling
Material damage due to low temperature 
Temperature control   
Low-Other Minor release Damage to line release by filling     
High-Other Rupture Damage to line Release while filling concentration based alarm, emergency shut 
down of filling operation 
Truck in pit during unloading to limit pool size 
and evaporation. 
Collision protection of unloading equipment , 
lines, valves and pumps. 
  
 
 
Operational Phase:      
  
  
      
Plant: Refuelling station  Design/operating pressure 15bar / 8bar  
Plant section Tank Design/operating temperature 20 gr.C  
Hazop Group: jepa, nidu  Date  18.10.2004
Pressure Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
            
no Open to atmosphere Leak  
Tank or pipe connections, 
corrosion, material failure 
NH3 release Tank in filled concrete pit 
NH3 detector 
Corrosion protection 
Periodic testing 
  
         
low Low pressure Tank empty-control failure   Control system   
            
            
high High pressure Collission NH3 release Tank in filled concrete pit 
NH3 detector 
  
    High temperature See high temperature    
    Overfilling Rupture of tank after increase of 
temperature 
Design pressure of tank higher than 
filling pump maximum pressure 
High level control and alarms 
Minimum temperature of charge 
No possibility for filling if the 
remaining empty storage capacity is 
less than 1 truck load. 
Temperature      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
low   Heating on filling line failed Overfilling due to increase of liquid volume 
( temperature increase in tank) 
Temperature control and alarm on 
filling line 
  
high   Fire NH3 release Tank in filled concrete pit 
NH3 detector 
  
    Fire Melting and release Tank in filled concrete pit 
NH3 detector 
  
    Control failure in heater None     
Flow      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
Other than Air in system Connection system  Air collects in tank Periodic controlled venting and 
analysis 
  
Level      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no empty Control failure       
    Leak  
Tank or pipe connections 
 NH3 detector   
Low Low level Control failure 
Delivery failure 
See no pressure     
High High level Control failure See High pressure     
Reaction      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
            
High Run away reaction? Mix with wrong substance Undesired reaction in tank. Damage of 
system. Corrosion 
Connections are substance specific.   
Reverse Decomposition?         
Other      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no           
low External leak   See no pressure     
high External rupture   see high pressure     
 
 
Operational Phase: filling a car     
Plant: Refuelling station  Design/operating 
pressure 
15 bar  
Plant section filling line to car connection   Design/operating 
temperature 
ambient  
     
Hazop Group: jepa, nidu  Date 18.Oct 2004  
Flow Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
No No flow Compressor failure        
    valves not open, connection not assured       
    control system failure       
    Leak in suction line       
    Tank emty       
low Low flow Leak        
    Compressor failure       
    valves not completely open       
    line partly blocked       
    Vacuum line not closed       
    Low level in tank       
High high flow tank station compressor pressure too high       
Also impurities low grade in station tank,       
    damage in tank filling system       
Other than wrong substance wrong substance in filling station tank, wrong 
delivery 
Damage of car system     
    station tank empty and other gases in vapour 
space, failure of control system 
      
Reverse Reverse flow Compressor failure during filling none     
Other than-Phase gas phase same     ? 
    not compressible gas, wrong substance, 
station tank empty 
      
Pressure      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
No no pressure, se no flow         
Low low pressure No flow? Evaporation. 2-phase   No fuelling operation if level in 
underground tank is low. 
  
High high pressure Too high pressure from compressor   System design pressure above 
compressor maximum pressure. 
  
Also-Phase two phase flow High temperature (vapour pressure > 
compressor pressure 
    ? 
Temperature      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
No Freezing         
Low Low temperature         
High High temperature External fire Damage of system and 
release of NH3 
Material choice and fire protection 
of the system 
Shut down of filling station. 
  
Other     Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
No-Other Failure of utilities no power Failure of control and 
safety system. 
Cannot deconnect car 
from filling station. 
Independent safety power supply to 
control systems and vacuum pump 
system. 
  
Low-Other Minor release Damage to line Release of NH3 Emergency shut down system.   
High-Other Rupture Forgotten to de-connect the system before 
driving. 
Damage of system and 
Release of NH3 
Interlock system between car and 
filling system. 
  
 
 
Operational Phase: Emtying the filling system     
Plant: Refuelling station  Design/operating pressure   
  
  
      
Plant section Vacuum line  Design/operating temperature 
Hazop Group: jepa, nidu  Date  18.10.2004
Guide word Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions 
Pressure           
no Atmospheric pressure Leak on suction side during vacuum 
pump operation 
Air in ground tank. System is tested before each 
refuellig operation. 
  
            
low           
            
            
high Hight pressure during required 
operation of the vaccum system 
Vacuum pump failure NH3 in filling line after use. Pressure control on vacuum line. 
Cannot disconnect. 
  
   Valve closed NH3 in filling line after use.     
   Control system failure NH3 in filling line after use.     
   Non-return valve stucked in open 
position. 
NH3 in filling line after use.     
           
Temperature      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
high High temperature short cut in electrical system Damage of system 
Fire - release 
Use of classified components   
Flow      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no   Vacuum pump not running NH3 in filling line after use.     
   Valve not open       
   Control system failure       
low           
high   Filling system still running       
Also Liquid in vacuum line Filling system still running Possible damage to vacuum system Designed to withstand liquid Depends on design of liquid 
separator. 
Other      Deviation Causes Consequences Safeguards Actions
no Utility failure Vacuum pump not running Cannot disconnect Independent powersupply   
low External leak   Cannot reach vacuum Cannot disconnect   
high External rupture Collision   System collision protected.   
other than wrong substance In-leak during use of vacuum 
system 
Air into system 
Water into system 
Pressure control detects leakage.   
 
Mission 
To promote an innovative and environmentally sustainable 
technological development within the areas of energy, industrial 
technology and bioproduction through research, innovation and 
advisory services. 
Vision 
Risø’s research shall extend the boundaries for the 
understanding of nature’s processes and interactions right 
down to the molecular nanoscale.  
The results obtained shall set new trends for the development 
of sustainable technologies within the fields of energy, industrial 
technology and biotechnology. 
The efforts made shall benefit Danish society and lead to the 
development of new multi-billion industries.  
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